Concept identification : by Williams, Warren Vail,
This dissertation has been 
micrcfihned exactly as received 69-12,448
WILLIAMS, Warren Vail, 1940- 
CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION: EFFECT OF 
STIMULUS REDUNDANCY AND HYPOTHESIS 
BEHAVIOR IN SCHIZOPHRENICS AND NORMALS.
The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1969 
Psychology, experimental
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION; EFFECT OF STIMULUS REDUNDANCY AND 
HYPOTHESIS BEHAVIOR IN SCHIZOPHRENICS AND NORMALS
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
WARREN VAIL WILLIAMS 
Norman, Oklahoma 
1968
CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION: EFFECT OF STIMULUS REDUNDANCY AND
HYPOTHESIS BEHAVIOR IN SCHIZOPHRENICS AND NORMALS
APPRO
7
DISSERTATION COMMITSEE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
1 wish to express here my sincere appreciation to the many 
people lAo have helped make this investigation possible. This includes 
the physicians and nursing staff of the Veterans Administration Hospital, 
as well as various administrative officials and record room employees.
The author would like to extend a very special heartfelt 
gratitude to Dr. Vladimir Pishkin, his major professor, for providing 
invaluable stimulation and encouragement. Sincere appreciation is 
also extended to the dissertation committee for their continued assis­
tance and encouragement offered throughout this project.
Particular thanks are offered to Mrs. Elizabeth Rasmussen for 
film construction; Dr. Steven Fishkin for discussion time; and to Mr. 
William Coleman for help in equipment building.
A final statement of thanks is also extended to the author's 
wife, Sandy, for having helped with typing and problems along the way. 
Without her support and encouragement, this dissertation would not have 
been possible.
iii
table of contents
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................  ill
LIST OF TABLES...............................................  v
LIST OF FIGURES...............................................  vi
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT ...............  1
II. CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION................................. 17
III. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM................................... 36
IV. METHOD.................................................  43
V. RESULTS...............................................  50
VI. DISCUSSION............................................. 98
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS..............................  126
REFERENCES...................................................  131
APPENDIX
I. CRITERIA FOR GROUPS................................... 143
II. STIMULUS DIMENSIONS................................... 146
III. INSTRUCTIONS........................................... 148
IV. PRESENTATION ORDER, DEMOGRAPHIC, PSYCHOMETRIC, ERROR,
TRIAL, T^ ALK TIME, AND HYPOTHESIS CHARACTERISTICS. . . 152
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Diagnostic Categories ................................. 43
2. Distribution of Normal Patients.......................  44
3. Analysis of Variance: Log Errors.....................  52
4. Analysis of Variance: Log Trials.....................  62
5. Analysis of Variance: Log Talk Time...................  76
6. Simple Effects Analysis of Variance: Talk Time for
R X £  Interaction................................... 81
7. Analysis of Hypothesis Behavior: All Experimental
Conditions................................... . . . 84
8. Mean Proportions of Each Hypothesis Characteristic at
Each Level of Irrelevant Information for Normals
and Schizophrenics................................... 85
9. Mean Proportions of Each Hypothesis Characteristic at
Each Level of Relevant Information for Normals and 
Schizophrenics.......................................  87
10. Mean Proportions of Each Hypothesis Characteristic at
Each Level of Stimulus Uncertainty (3, 5, or 7 
Dimensions) for Normals and Schizophrenics..........  89
11. Mean Frequencies of Each Stimulus Dimension for
Normals and Schizophrenics..........................  93
12. Group Differences on Demographic and Psychometric
Tests......................................   95
13. Correlations of Rigidity Quotients with Concept
Identification Errors ............................... 95
14. Correlations of Rigidity Quotients with Hypothesis
Behavior.............................................  96
V
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Mean log errors for 0, 2, and 4 irrelevant dimensions
at different levels of relevant dimensions.
(Irrelevant dimensions by relevant dimensions
with groups pooled.)............................... 54
2. Mean log errors for 1 relevant dimension at different
levels of complexity. (Groups are pooled.). . . . . .  56
3. Mean log errors for normals and schizophrenics at
different levels of relevant dimensions with 0
bits of irrelevant information................  57
4. Mean log errors for normals and schizophrenics at
different levels of complexity with 1 bit of
relevant information ...............................  59
5. Mean log errors for normals and schizophrenics at
different levels of complexity with 1, 3, and 5
relevant dimensions............................. 60
6. Mean log errors per block of 16 trials as a function
of different complexity levels with 1 bit of
relevant information. (Groups are pooled.)....  64
7. Mean log errors per block of 16 trials as a function
of different levels of relevant information.
(Groups and complexity are pooled. )............  65
8. Mean log errors per block of 16 trials for normals
as a function of different experimental conditions.
(Learning curve for each experimental condition.). . 67
9. Mean log errors per block of 16 trials for schizo­
phrenics as a function of different experimental 
conditions. (Learning curves for each experimental 
condition.) ." . 68
vi
Figure Page
10. Mean log errors per block of 16 trials for normals
and schizophrenics as a function of 1 and 3 relevant 
dimensions with 4 bits of irrelevant information. . . 69
11. Mean log errors per block of 16 trials for normals
and schizophrenics as a function of 6 bits of
irrelevant information...............................  71
12. Mean log errors per block of 16 trials for normals
and schizophrenics as a function of 0, 2, and 4
bits of irrelevant information with 1 relevant
dimension...........................................  72
13. Mean log errors per block of 16 trials for normals
and schizophrenics as a function of 0, 2, and 4
bits of irrelevant information with 3 relevant
dimensions...........................................  73
14. Mean log errors per block of 16 trials for normals
and schizophrenics as a function of 0 and 2 bits
of irrelevant information with 5 relevant
dimensions...........................................  74
15. Mean log talk time in seconds for normals and schizo­
phrenics as a function of different complexity
levels with 1 bit of relevant information-..........  78
16. Mean log talk time in seconds for the 0 and 2 levels
of complexity at 1, 3, and 5 relevant dimension
levels. (Groups are pooled.) ....................... 80
17. Mean log errors for normals and schizophrenics at
different levels of actual stimulus uncertainty.
(Total irrelevant and relevant dimensions.) ........  110
vii
CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION; EFFECT OF STIMULUS 
REDUNDANCY AND HYPOTHESIS BEHAVIOR IN 
SCHIZOPHRENICS AND NORMALS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The study of thinking or cognitive processes, of which 
concepts are one of the principal tools of thinking and were among 
the first psychological problems to be investigated, has a long and 
formidable past. At one time, prior to the first World War, the in­
vestigation of the higher mental processes was considered a core topic 
within psychology. However, since that time and up to 1950 many 
individuals (e.g. Hebb, 1949) have criticized psychology for not 
adequately dealing with thought or cognitive processes.
Recently, as Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) have pointed 
out, there has been a stimulated increase in the interest and investi­
gation of cognitive processes. This renewed interest in the area of 
cognitive functioning seems to have stemmed from several sources. One 
of these sources has been the recognition of mediating processes which 
intervene between the classical "stimulus" and "response"; in this 
respect, £-R learning had hoped psychology would eliminate anything 
dealing with "mental processes." This ^-R bond concept was transformed
1
2into an ^ -0-R concept whereby the 0^  stood for the subtle events that 
could occur between the input of a physical stimulus and the outcome of 
an observable response. Other sources stem from information theory 
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949), personality theory (e.g. Allport, 1959), 
and experimenters working with animals (Fields, 1932; Lashley, 1934; 
Harlow, 1949). All of these sources contributed to ideas that lead 
away from the assumption of a sensory dominance of behavior and more 
toward the acceptance of autonomous central processes of which concept 
formation is an integral part.
Although the investigation of concepts was studied by the 
ancient Greeks, other cognitive processes, such as sensation, perception, 
retention, serial learning, and imagery have been investigated more 
frequently. At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was felt that 
cognitive processes could be identified by discerning their qualitative 
characteristics as conscious experiences. In fact, the early scienti­
fic approach attempted to analyze concept formation by studying the 
conscious experience attendant upon it. However, early investigators 
who were members of the "Wurzberg School" demonstrated by careful 
introspective observations that the above hypothetical process did not 
hold up. That is, if cognitive processes were responsible for certain 
judgments, those cognitive processes were not in themselves conscious, 
even though they yielded a conscious end product.
The same general finding resulted from experiments which 
sought to investigate more complex processes. Watt (1905), working 
in the Wurzberg laboratory, asked his subjects to report on their 
conscious processes when they were given tasks such as naming a
3ouperordloate for a subordinate, or a part for a whole. He found that
if an observer was adequately prepared, there was little or no observable
conscious content. Likewise, Boring reports that, with Ach,
. . .  it became clear that the problems of thought and action 
are essentially the same. In both cases one has some specific 
end to achieve, and the psychophysical process, released by a 
stimulus, runs its course to that end. To name a rhyme for a 
stimulus-word is psychologically no different from pressing a 
given finger when a given letter appears [1929, p. 404-405].
Thus, Ach and many of his contemporaries (Grunbaum, 1908; Moore, 1910; 
Fisher, 1916; English, 1922) continued to experiment within the frame­
work of introspective analysis.
It was not until 1920, when Hull (1920) made the first non- 
..iLrospective attempt to study concept learning, that an objective 
approach was established which was independent of introspection. His 
procedure was devised to collect data on possible quantitative relation­
ships between stimulus and response variables. In order to establish 
these relationships, Hull performed an experiment in which 144 Chinese 
characters were drawn on cards. The cards were divided into 12 packs, 
each containing 12 cards, and each pack consisted of one instance of 
each of the different concepts. Each card was exposed by means of a 
memory drum, and, with each presentation, a nonsense syllable was 
given which was to be associated with that character. The subject was 
told merely to leam the label. After the presentation of the first 
pack, the subject was requested to state what the label of each charac­
ter was. If he could not do so, prompting was given. This procedure 
continued through all 12 packs. The first six packs were considered 
the learning series, and the last six packs the test series. Three
4measures of concept acquisition were used: (1) the ability to state
the label of the concept when the learning series was repeated, (2) the 
number of promptings, and (3) a drawing of each concept or identical 
elements of each character. The general results showed that human 
subjects can gradually leam to associate a particular nonsense 
syllable with a particular, stable element of a changing stimulus 
pattern. Then once this association has been established, it can be 
transferred to a new stimulus pattern containing the element. Finally, 
the subject can accomplish this without necessarily being able to define 
the guiding concept. In this respect Hull had made two significant 
and related contibutions to behaviorism. He provided an experimental 
procedure for the study of cognitive functioning without recourse to 
introspection and he offered an analysis of concept formation in terms 
of ^-R relationships without recourse to processes occurring between 
observables. Although Hull did not confine his later theorizing to this 
level, there are several contemporary analyses of concept formation 
restricting themselves to ^-R relationships without maintaining any 
mediating events. For example, Skinner (1933; 1937) describes a 
process whereby any property of a stimulus.that is present when a 
response is reinforced acquires some degree of control over that 
response. The amount of control grows with the repeated occurrences 
of response and reinforcement in the presence of the stimulus, and 
this control continues to be exerted when the property appears in 
other combinations. According to Skinner, when behavior is brought 
under control by a single relevant property or by a few relevant 
stimulus features of a variety of otherwise dissimilar patterns, that
5behavior Is known as an abstraction and is called conceptual. In this 
sense, only the existence (or nonexistence) of the conditioned stimulus 
characteristics is critical, for these determine how the subject will 
respond.
Smoke (1932) criticized Hull's experiment by pointing out 
that concepts are rarely characterized by distinguishing identical 
elements or class marks. Rather, according to Smoke, concepts are 
defined by the common perceptual relationships which are used. That is, 
according to Smoke, it is the Gestalt or configurational pattern which 
defines the concept. In Smoke's experiment, he employed three criteria 
for mastery of a concept: (1) verbal definition, (2) drawing,
(3) choosing examples of the correct instance from a series of figures 
containing "correct" and "incorrect" designs. Smoke reported that the 
subjects could generally meet the last two criteria without necessarily 
meeting the first. Thus, a subject can form and use a concept without 
verbalization. This finding seems to be similar to the recent studies 
on "learning without awareness" and verbal conditioning (see Krasner, 
1958). Here, much is often made of the subject's lack of awareness, 
either of what he is learning or of the response-reinforcement contin­
gency. However, evidence is accumulating that such learning actually 
does not occur (Levin, 1959). It seems that awareness of the condition 
of reinforcement is necessary for learning to occur.
Smoke's experiment also demonstrated that concepts based on 
the common features of material more complex than that used by Hull 
(geometric design patterns of differing color, shape, position, width 
of lines, and number) can be formed even lAen no identical elements
6exist. Finally, the main differences between Hull and Smoke seem to 
be essentially concerned with a Gestalt-behavioristic split even 
though both were trying to establish an experimental definition of 
a concept centered around the discrimination of certain common aspects 
of a stimulus pattern.
Heidbreder (1946a, 1946b, 1947, 1948) used a method which was 
similar to Hull's and materials which were similar to Smoke's, in that 
the concepts were defined by some common relationships. The stimulus 
materials were presented via a memory drum and the materials could be 
classified into three categories such as concrete objects, spatial 
forms, and abstract numbers. The subjects were required to learn non­
sense syllable names for the various categories through the use of the 
anticipation method. From the results Heidbreder concluded that the 
concepts of concrete objects are attained most readily, with spatial 
objects next and abstract numbers last. Similarily, Heidbreder (1948, 
1949), attempting to increase the role of perception by using a card 
sorting format where subjects could manually sort the drawings into 
their respective piles, found that sorting for number was more difficult 
than sorting for concrete objects which was easier. Furthermore, Grant 
and his associates (Grant and Curran, 1953; Grant, Jones, and Tallantis, 
1949) using the Wisconsin Card Sort Task found somewhat different 
results from that of Heidbreder and her associates. Overall, the 
discrepancies seem to be related to the different experimental proce­
dures used by these investigators, to measure concept formation.
For example, one major difference lies in the fact that Heidbreder's sub­
jects were required to leam more than one concept concurrently whereas
7Grant's subjects were required to leam only one concept at a time.
In addition, in Heidbreder's procedure only one instance of a concept 
was presented at a time whereas in Grant's procedure each stimulus 
presentation was a different instance of the concept being learned at 
the time. Recently, Wohlwill (1937) showed experimentally that the 
"dominance heirarchy of concepts" will vary with different procedures.
He differentiated between abstraction, which he defines as a selective 
response to a given aspect of the stimulus, and conceptualization, which 
he considers a process of mediated generalization. Different experimen­
tal operations were set up to correspond with abstraction and conceptual­
ization. Finally, the results indicated that color and number are more 
easily abstracted than form, but that form and number are more easily 
conceptualized than color. Overall, though different experimental 
definitions of a concept have been attempted, the basic dimensions 
of size, form, color, and number still remain as standard in research 
on concept formation.
In any review of conceptual behavior or concept formation, 
one becomes immediately aware of the large volume of work reported 
on the performances and comparisons of various normal subject groups 
to different psychopathological groups. Indeed, it was Hull (1920) 
who suggested that the study of concept thinking in psychopathology 
may be fruitful. In addition, for many years a wealth of clinical 
observations have suggested that the conceptual processes are impaired 
in the schizophrenic and brain-damage individuals. Thus, the investi­
gation of conceptual behavior has been a prime objective in attempting 
to understand a conceptual deficit in schizophrenia. The following
8review will address itself to this area of investigation which is the 
focus of the present study.
Conceptual Deficit and Schizophrenia
The nature of conceptual deficit in schizophrenia has been 
well documented in a number of reviews (Cameron, 1944; Haufmann and 
Kasanin, 1942; Hunt and Cofer, 1944; Rabin and King, 1958; Payne, 1961; 
Lothrop, 1961; Buss and Lang, 1965; Lang and Buss, 1965; Yates, 1966a). 
In fact, a deficit in concept formation has long been considered as 
one of the most salient symptoms of schizophrenia.
Hull (1920) suggested that the study of concept thinking in 
psychopathology may be fruitful. In fact, he found that constitutional 
inferiors, dementia praecox subjects and peretics had greater difficulty 
in evolving functional concepts as compared to normals. However, it 
was not until 1934 that a Russian psychiatrist, Vigotsky, described a 
theory whereby the schizophrenic was characterized by a loss of ability 
to think in abstract concepts and a regression to a more primitive 
level. Vigotsky believed that the conceptual disturbance in schizo­
phrenia was a function of an underlying central nervous system disorder. 
In order to test his hypothesis, he developed a classification test 
made up of blocks (modification of one developed by Ach) of varying 
shapes, colors, and sizes that were to be placed in categories according 
to the concept in question. Kasanin and Haufmann (1938), continuing 
the work of Vigotsky's in America, not only confirmed Vigotsky's findings 
on a greater number of patients, but tried to place the test on a 
quantitative basis. In particular, Kasanin and Haufmann reported that
9although not all schizophrenics showed conceptual disturbances when 
compared with normals, those who did show such a disturbance manifested 
a general deterioration of conceptual thinking and an inability to 
generalize.
Other investigators, working with brain-damage individuals, 
have found similar results as those reported by Vigotsky, Haufmann, and 
Kasanin (e.g. Bychowski, 1935). Probably the most noted series of 
studies which is very similar, theoretically, to that of the Haufmann- 
Kasanin studies are the works of Goldstein (1939a; 1939b) and his 
associates (Holies and Goldstein, 1938; Goldstein and Sheerer, 1941). 
The Goldstein and Sheerer sorting test included such objects as blocks, 
skeins of wool, and everyday objects which could be sorted into 
conceptual groups reflecting dimensions of color, shape, size as well 
as category labels. The results of such tests have been interpreted 
by Goldstein and his associates as showing an impairment in the ability 
to maintain the "abstract attitude," resulting in concreteness, and 
resembling the impairment found in certain types of brain pathology.
Overall, Goldstein, Vigotsky, and Haufmann-Kasanin typify 
one interpretation of a conceptual deficit in schizophrenia. This is 
that an abstract attitude may be achieved only by normal'adults ; 
individuals outside of this class (schizophrenics and brain-damaged) 
are characterized by a marked loss of the ability to conceptualize on 
an abstract level, and by an increased tendency toward the use of 
concrete forms of conceptualization. However, these findings are not 
clear, since poor scores on these tests could be purely a function of 
mental slowness or a tendency to produce unusual generalizations. That
10
is. It was very difficult to differentiate between the performances of 
schizophrenics and brain-damaged Individuals on these tests. In 
addition. In the many Investigations cited In support of this approach, 
adequate control groups were absent and Inadequate statistical 
procedures were used. Recently, better controlled studies, using 
"sorting" tests of concept formation have produced more consistent 
results. Schizophrenics are not regarded as concrete In the sense of 
being unable to generalize at all. Rather, they tend to produce unusual 
generalizations. For example, Rapaport, Gill, and Schafer (1945), using 
an object sorting test similar to Goldstein, found that a group of 
schizophrenics were no more "concrete" than normals. The concepts which 
the schizophrenics evolved tended to be eccentric and unusual. Similar 
results have been reported by Fisher (1950), who found no difference be­
tween schizophrenics and hysterics; by Rashkls, Cushman, and Landis 
(1946), lAio found that schizophrenics could form concepts but they were 
eccentric and unlike those used by normals; by Fey (1951) who found that 
schizophrenics had a higher frequency of perseveratlve responses even 
though they could form concepts. Finally, recent studies have shown 
that schizophrenics can form the same kind of concepts as normals (Hall, 
1962; Kew, 1963) or whatever kind of conceptual deficit Is present. It 
Is not due to an Impairment In abstracting ability (Ross, 1963; Nathan, 
1964; True, 1966; Salzman, Goldstein, Atkins, and Bablglan, 1966).
Partly because of a reluctance to accept an organic Interpre­
tation as to the nature of a conceptual deficit In schizophrenia, other 
Investigators have centered on a functional Interpretation. Cameron 
(1938a, 1938b, 1939a, 1939b, 1944) felt that a conceptual deficit In
11
schizophrenia was due to a disturbance In social communication and/or 
In substalnlng attention (overlncluslon) rather than an actual loss of 
abstract ability. Cameron argues, In one sense, that concepts formed 
by schizophrenics are "overInclusive," they are unable to maintain the 
normal conceptual boundaries, and Incorporate Into their concept elements 
(some of them personal) which are merely associated with the concept, 
but are not an essential part of It. It Is Interesting to note that 
Cameron relegated disturbances In conceptual functioning as secondary 
In nature to the schizophrenics' Interpersonal difficulties or "social 
disarticulation." Since Cameron's Initial formulation, there have been 
many studies Investigating "overlncluslon" In schizophrenics. At first, 
many studies (e.g. Zaslow, 1950; Lovlbond, 1954; McGaughran and Moran,
1956; Payne, Matussek, and George, 1959) have shown positive results, 
that Is, overlncluslve behavior Is part of schizophrenia. However, 
recently, even though Payne (1962) and his associates (Payne, Calrd, 
and Laverty, 1964) have been fairly consistent In finding schizophrenics 
to be overlncluslve In their thinking, other studies have tended to 
criticize the concept of overlncluslon (e.g. Ellseo, 1963; Goldstein 
and Salzman, 1965; Strum, 1965). Overall, It Is apparent that whether 
overlncluslon Is a characteristic of schizophrenia or not, may very 
well depend upon the measure or test used to establish overlncluslve 
thinking. Different tests find different results and even those tests 
that do find positive results are often not reliable (Goldstein and 
Salzman, 1965). Furthermore, over Indus Iveness may be confounded with 
a more general Idea of concreteness (Strum, 1965), or may be a function 
of heterogenlty differences within the schizophrenic diagnosis (Buss, 1966).
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Traditionally, as has been pointed out, the work of Goldstein 
(1939a, 1944, 1963) with the loss of the abstract attitude on the one 
hand, and that of Cameron (1947) with interpersonal dysfunction and over­
inclusion on the other hand, has been used to illustrate the nature of 
the conceptual deficit in schizophrenia. However, in recent years, 
many investigators of cognitive deficit in schizophrenia (e.g. Chapman 
and McGhie, 1962, 1963, 1964; Yates, 1966a, 1966b; Buss and Lang, 1965; 
Buss, 1966) have placed emphasis on an impaired selective attention, 
inability to maintain a set, and an inability to process incoming 
information efficiently. From such studies, it is clear that a theo­
retical orientation regarding psychological deficit in schizophrenia has 
been emerging. The orientation centers around conceptualizing the 
human operator as an information-processing unit. Essentially the 
model can be outlined as follows: any set of sequential stimuli have
to pass through various levels of the nervous system before a response 
is made. For example, stimuli must first be received by the organism 
and translated into peripheral physiological data (receptor level); 
next, the data is subjected to initial organization for orderly pre­
sentation to higher nervous structures (data processing level); finally, 
the data is dealt with by the highest parts of the nervous system 
(cortical or mediation level). In terms of this model, it seems 
possible that any thought disorder in schizophrenia could be due to a 
cortical or mediation level, or due to a failure at a lower level which 
will adversely effect higher levels of thinking, even though the higher 
levels are not impaired. Empirical evidence which supports the model 
has shown that in comparison to normal subjects, schizophrenics have
13
a marked inability to attend selectively to stimuli in such a way that
only relevant information is processed (McGhie, Champman, and Lawson,
1965a); a deficit in channel capacity which increases with chronicity
(Pishkin, 1966); an inability to maintain a set over time and in shifting
a set when necessary (Shakow, 1963). Thus, it appears that although
schizophrenics have a conceptual deficit, it is not due to a loss of
abstractness (Lothrop, 1961; Tolor, 1964). Rather, it appears due to an
inability to screen out irrelevant information and noise in order to
process relevant incoming data. In fact, McGhie and Chapman, using
Broadbent's (1958) filter theory, have postulated that:
. . . schizophrenic patients have a marked inability to attend 
selectively to stimuli in such a way that only relevant informa­
tion is processed. This inability on the part of the schizo­
phrenic to filter out irrelevant data tends to lead to an 
overloading of the limited information processing and storing 
mechanism available to him [1965b, p. 397].
Overall, it appears that the interference and distraction
in the input and organization of relevant information as well as
an abnormally slow rate of processing relevant information (Yates,
1966a, 1966b) tends to disrupt the schizophrenic's performance on a
variety of perceptual-cognitive tasks.
Hypothesis, Strategies. and Conceptual Behavior
As Van De Geer and Jaspers suggested, cognitive processes
can be differentiated from simple learning processes in their emphasis
on strategies when,
. . . the individual is selectively collecting inputs in order
to arrive at a final or semifinal decision, he brings with him
a view of his own in dealing with the environment. This seems
to imply that cognitive behavior cannot be explained by learning
14
principles alone. Rather, we must look for principles which 
govern the selection of experience and its further processing 
[1966, p. 147].
In order to develop a more complete description and understanding of 
human conceptual behavior, it would seem important to consider an indi­
vidual's approach to a conceptual task.
In the beginning, hypothesis behavior theories were first 
developed and evaluated in the context of experimental tasks, like 
discrimination learning, which are simpler than conceptual problems.
In fact, Krechevsky (1932) produced some important and convincing 
evidence on hypothesis-like behavior in rats while they were learning 
a simple two-choice discrimination task. More recently, Levine (1959, 
1963, 1966, 1967) has adapted certain features of Krechevsky's analyses 
and coupled them with Harlow's (1959) error factor notions so as to 
produce a more explicit model of hypothesis behavior in humans and in 
somewhat more complicated circumstances. Perhaps the most noted pio­
neering work done on hypothesis or strategies for conceptual problems 
was by Bruner et al. (1956). Bruner and his colleagues inspected the 
subject's stimulus selections and verbalized hypotheses in order to 
detect systematic, sequential behavior of the subjects. By using such 
stimulus material as thematic cards, geometric designs (color, size, 
border), facial types, and aircraft designs, Bruner et al. obtained 
four kinds of strategies: "conservative focusing," "focus gambling,"
"successive" and "simultaneous scanning." These strategies are referred 
to as selection strategies. That is, the subject selects his own 
instances of vdiat he thinks the concept is.
Several investigators, rather than rely on the selection
15
paradigm, have used the reception paradigm whereby the subject has no 
opportunity to select stimuli and must rely on an experimentally regulated 
flow of information. Bruner et in using this approach, reported 
two ideal strategies: the "wholist" strategy, and the "partist" 
strategy. In fact, Bruner et al. stated that:
In the main, the focussing strategy appropriate to an 
initial whole hypothesis is less demanding both on inference 
and memory than the scanning strategy required to make good 
an initial part hypothesis . . .  It appears that far more 
people prefer to start with a whole hypothesis than with 
any other form of hypothesis. Moreover, people are consistent 
from problem to problem in their initial approach [1956, p. 150].
Bourne (1963) reported results which were in accord with Bruner
et al. However, in contrast. Bourne reported that the "wholist"
strategy was used in only nine per cent of the problems. Furthermore,
Bourne (1965) using the reception paradigm involving constant clusters
and investigating the relationship between category responses and
hypothesis, reported that the efficient learner starts with a more
encompassing initial hypothesis (wholists), changes it only after he
makes a category error, and changes the hypothesis in only one respect
at a time. Also, the more efficient learners' hypotheses tend to be
more consistent with previously given information.
Overall, most of the studies and positions espoused by many 
of the investigators tend to remain largely as post-hoc descriptions 
of experimental data. Furthermore, since most concept formation tasks 
are based upon a reception paradigm, it would appear that Bourne's (1965) 
analysis of hypothesis behavior in relation to category responses could 
be applied to the identification of concepts. Finally, although most
16
of the results have tended to support Bruner's et al. original findings, 
most comparisons have been between successful or efficient learners and 
less efficient learners rather than different psychopathological groups.
CHAPTER II
CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION
Readier (1964) pointed out the distinction between "concept 
acquisition" and "concept identification" tasks, concept identification 
(Cl) tasks are those in which the subject has available, at the begin­
ning of the task, the response common to the dissimilar stimuli. That 
is, when a person is said to be using previously learned discriminations 
and habits, rather than the learning of new ones, to solve conceptual 
problems, he is engaged in the task of ÇI. Concept acquisition tasks 
involve the learning of the common response. The primary concern of 
this investigation is a ÇI task.
In order to qualify as ÇI a task must fulfill two requirements 
(Gamer, 1962). First, as Readier (1961) suggested, the same response 
must be assigned to more than one stimulus. Unless the same response 
is elicited by two or more dissimilar stimuli the subject cannot be 
said to have identified a concept. It is this requirement that differ­
entiates ÇI tasks from paired-associate tasks where each stimulus has 
a unique response. The second requirement of ÇI tasks is that the 
stimuli involved be multivariate in nature. Since the stimuli must 
be multivariate in nature, it is possible for the experimenter to decide 
A priori which of the stimulus dimensions will be used in classifying 
the events and which, if any, will not be used in the classification
17
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of events. The former dimensions are called relevant dimensions and 
the latter irrelevant dimensions. Once the experimenter has made the 
decision concerning the relevant and irrelevant dimensions the subject's 
task becomes one of ascertaining which variables are relevant and which 
are irrelevant and identifying the state or states of the relevant 
variables which defines the concept.
Finally, many different types of concepts have been used in 
Cl tasks. Bruner et (1956) used three basic types of concepts: 
conjunctive, disjunctive, and rational. Neisser and Weene (1962) 
constructed ten types of concepts, all of which involved only the presence 
or absence of just two variables. Recently, Haygood and Bourne (1965) 
summarized the various concept types and suggested that the structure 
of concepts reveals two major features: relevant attributes, and the 
conceptual rule by which the attributes are combined to form the concept. 
Haygood and Bourne pointed out further that most Cl studies have employed 
simple and familiar unidimensional concepts. For example, in a problem 
using three dimensions, e.g., color, form, and size, the correct 
solution might be form whereby the subject would have to respond 
"square" to A and "triangle" to jB regardless of changes in color or 
size. It is this type of familiar unidimensional concept that will be 
utilized in the present investigation.
Cl and Mathematical Model
Learning is probably the one area in psychology which 
has adapted well to various mathematical treatments applied to it. As 
early as 1885, Ebbinghaus utilized a procedure referred to as empirical 
curve-fitting in order to represent his retention curves. In extending
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the idea of empirical curve-fitting to rational curve-fitting, mathe­
matics was rapidly taking its place in serving psychological theory.
For example, Thurstone (1930a, 1930b) stated that when a person performs 
a number of responses per unit of time, his learning ability is based upon 
the probability that one of his responses will be successful. Other 
developments have stemmed from Hull's e^ al. (1940) vigorous mathematical 
theorizing and symbolic logic, but, perhaps more important was the 
development of a systematic analysis of human communication (Shannon 
and Weaver, 1949). "Information Theory" has provided a unit by which 
information can be measured. This unit of information is generally 
defined in terms of how much uncertainty is reduced by a selection of 
an alternative. That is, the more alternatives there are, the more 
information is conveyed by each choice. This relationship of informa­
tion to the number of alternatives can be given a more formal expression. 
The expression is:
H = logg A (1) 
where H is the amount of information in bits, and A represents the 
number of alternatives. Thus, the amount of information yielded by 
specifying one of a number of alternatives increases as the log (see 
equation 1) of the number of alternatives. In this respect the log is 
to the base two refering to the binary system or two choice situations. 
Also, the information "unit" is referred to as "bit" (binary digit) and 
refers to two choice situations. Thus, since the operation of binary 
choice involves the choice between two alternatives, one can measure 
the bits by determining to what power 2 has to be raised in order to 
arrive at the number of alternatives. Finally, it was not long after
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the development of information theory until the first applications to 
concept learning (Hovland, 1952). These initial applications of inform­
ation analysis to concept formation studies did much to stimulate 
research in cognitive processes in general and in particular to Cl tasks.
A model utilizing a combination of rational and empirical 
methods of describing a learning function as well as utilization of 
information theory techniques has been developed by Bourne and Restie 
(1959). This model, dealing explicitly with Cl problems, has been 
called a cue conditioning and/or a stimulus sampling theory whereby it 
is assumed that relevant (rewarded) cues are conditioned and irrelevant 
(unrewarded) cues are adapted. That is, by the use of reinforcement 
(information feedback) relevant cues, which are consistently associated 
with a given (conceptual) response, gradually become conditioned to the 
response; irrelevant cues, which are not consistently associated with 
any available response come to lose their effectiveness and are adapted. 
It is assumed that the rate of learning (conditioning and adaptation) 
is determined by the proportion of relevant cues as well as the proba­
bility that a cue is present at the time of reinforcement. Of course, 
the greater the proportion of relevant cues in any given universe of 
stimuli, then the greater is the probability of selecting one or more 
of these cues while sampling. Overall, the theoretical parameters are 
generally derived mathematically, and they are based on probability 
statements. For instance. Bourne and Restle (1959) suggested that the 
Cl learning rate parameter (0) is determined by the proportion of rele­
vant cues (r) times the proportion of trials on which a relevant cue 
is reinforced (a). Furthermore, if relevant cues are reinforced 100% of
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the time, as in the present investigation. Bourne and Restle developed 
the following equation to account for the theoretical (6) of an indivi­
dual learner. That is,
0 = kR
R+I+B (2)
where k is the proportion of relevant cues utilized, R. and are the 
number of relevant and irrelevant cues in the problem, respectively, 
and 2  is the total amount of background irrelevant (uncorrelated) stimu­
lation from the experimental setting. As one can see the k and ^  para­
meters must be determined empirically; however, once these values are 
established, the formula can be used to predict the difficulty of con­
cept identification with different combinations of relevant and irre- 
velant information.
Recently, Pishkin and Blanchard (1963), working within the 
Bourne and Restle framework, extended the model in order to account for 
social cues in a Cl task. When both social and stimulus cues are 
available as well as relevant, along with irrelevant stimulus cues, 
Pishkin and Blanchard showed that:
0g^ + soc. = kR+lS
R+I+B+S (3)
where 1 is the proportion of social cues utilized and ^  refers to the 
overall value of the social cue (other person). The other parameters 
(k,R,^,B^) are the same as in equation two (2). The basic assumption 
here is the additivity of cues; however, Pishkin and Bourne (In Press) 
have shown that the additivity of cues assumption holds for normal 
subjects, but not for schizophrenics.
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Complexity
Of the many experimental variables that Cl studies have been 
concerned with, perhaps task complexity has been given the most attention. 
Many of the early investigators of concept learning (Chapter I) had no 
direct, systematic, or independent means of measuring task complexity 
from that of the subject's response. Generally, qualitative differences 
in performance were used to determine complexity of a concept. The most 
common rule for establishing complexity among early investigators was 
the ease with which a concept was acquired. In the mathematical theory 
of Cl (Bourne and Restle, 1959), the cues are represented, in part, by 
the number of relevant and irrelevant dimensions which define the concept. 
Furthermore, the assumption is made that the measure of relevant cues 
is proportional to the number of relevant dimensions whereas the measure 
of irrelevant cues is proportional to the number of dimensions made 
irrelevant. Thus, a definition of complexity in a Cl task can be in 
terms of the number of irrelevant dimensions to relevant dimensions: the 
greater the irrelevant to relevant dimensions, the greater the complexity. 
The main advantage in this approach is the ability to define quantita­
tively difficulty levels independent of the subject's response. This has 
been a longstanding problem in the area of learning and concept formation.
It wasn't until 1932 that the perennial problem of task 
difficulty level came under a more systematic experimental definition. 
During this period, Hovland (1952), as well as Underwood (1952), sug­
gested how information theory, through probability measures, might be 
used to quantify the variable of task complexity. Thus, Archer, Bourne,
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and Brown (1955) Investigated a method, in which complexity was the 
main variable, designed to assess the complexity of stimuli, independently 
of the subject's responses. The above authors varied task complexity 
quantitatively by systematically increasing the amount of irrelevant 
information along different binary stimulus dimensions. It was assumed 
that complexity was defined by the number of irrelevant dimensions to 
relevant dimensions. For example, in one experiment. Archer et^  al. used 
two bits of relevant information and one, two, and three bits of irrelevant 
information. In the two experiments performed, the authors reported that 
systematic increases in the amount of irrelevant information made the 
task increasingly difficult and resulted in a significant linear relation­
ship (in terms of errors) up to around four bits of irrelevant information. 
However, the relationship seemed to become positively accelerated as 
a fifth bit was included. Later research involving the complexity 
variable (e.g. Bourne, 1957; Bourne and Pendleton, 1958; Pishkin, 1960) 
finds the relationship to contain more of a linear component rather than 
quadratic or accelerated, even with the fifth bit of irrelevant infor­
mation included. Indeed, the complexity variable appears to be the 
most clear, stable, and repeatable effect found in studies involving 
concept identification.
Although the finding that the number of errors is linearly 
related to the number of dimensions has often appeared regularly, 
this finding has been incidental to that of other experimental variables 
being investigated. For example, some of the experimental variables 
which show significant main effects, along with the significant com­
plexity main effect, include the following: delay of information feed-
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back (Bourne, 1957); response tendencies (Pishkin, 1961b); redundant 
relevant Information (Bourne and Haygood, 1959); Intertrlal Interval 
(Bourne, Gury, Todd, and Justesen, 1965); electromyographlcal gradients 
(Pishkin and Wolfgang, 1964); sex £uid problems In auditory concept 
Identification (Pishkin and Shurley, 1965); dimension availability and 
misinformation feedback (Pishkin, 1965); finally, social versus mechani­
cal feedback (Lydecker, Pishkin, and Martin, 1961; Pishkin, 1963). 
Furthermore, In the above studies complexity was defined In terms of the 
Increase In the number of Irrelevant dimensions; however, two studies 
have Investigated the effect of complexity defined somewhat differently. 
Walker and Bourne (1961), using all possible combinations of three 
Independent levels of relevant and Irrelevant dimensions In a factorial 
design, found that the most difficult problem was the one Involving the 
three levels of relevant and three levels of Irrelevant dimensions. 
Individual comparisons of the two variables showed that the amount of 
relevant Information had the greatest effect on performance. Thus, as 
the number of Independent relevant dimensions Increase, so does problem 
difficulty. Here, "Independent" refers to the fact that the relevant 
dimensions were not contingent upon or correlated with one another In 
any way. Finally, Battlg and Bourne (1960) compared Interdlmenslonal 
variability (complexity In terms of Irrelevant dimensions) and Intra- 
dlmenslonal variability (complexity In terms of number of values within 
a dimension) In a factorial design. The results revealed that both main 
effects of Interdlmenslonal and Intradlmenslonal were highly significant. 
Thus, It was demonstrated that complexity Increased directly with the 
number of values per dimension. Furthermore, this effect did not Inter­
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act with or change the basic relationship between performance and inter- 
dimensional variability.
Another source of interest in the complexity variable has 
centered around possible interactions with other experimental variables 
within the concept identification framework. Perhaps the most noted 
variable found to interact with complexity is that of "misinformation 
feedback." This interaction has been demonstrated by Bourne and 
Pendleton (1958); Morin (1955); Pishkin (1960, 1961a, 1965); Pishkin, 
Shurley, and Wolfgang (1967); Wolfgang, Pishkin, and Lundy (1962). 
Misinformation feedback has generally been defined as feedback which 
indicates to the subject that he had responded correctly (or incorrectly) 
when in fact the reverse was actually true. Pishkin (1960) demonstrated 
the nature of the interaction between complexity and misinformation (MF) 
which had been suggested in the Bourne and Pendleton study. Five per­
centages of W  (up to 40%) were combined in a factorial arrangement with 
three levels of complexity. The results showed that both main effects 
were significant; however, as irrelevant information increases misin­
formation feedback becomes increasingly disadvantageous to performance. 
Finally, Pishkin (1961a) attempted to demonstrate what effect the dis­
tribution of misinformation would have in concept identification. A 
factorial arrangement involving two levels of ^  (which was distributed 
randomly or regularly over a specific number of trials), two levels of 
complexity, and three different problems were employed. All main effects, 
except problems, as well as the interaction of misinformation and 
con^lexity, were significant sources of variance. In addition to sub­
stantiating previous findings regarding W  and complexity (Pishkin, 1960),
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the results revealed that when the distribution of W  Is more evenly 
distributed there Is a less Inhibiting effect upon performance.
In summary. It can be stated that the effect of the complexity 
variable within the Cl framework Is In every case unambiguous. Indeed, 
as Underwood (1949) suggested "(1) that more research concentrate on 
the theoretical aspects of conceptual behavior, and (2) that tasks of 
various levels of complexity be developed and standardized to facilitate 
Inter-laboratory communication," complexity has been defined Independent 
of the subject's responses as well as described In strict mathematical 
theoretical terms. Perhaps, more than any other variable, complexity 
has been found to demonstrate stable and repeatable effects on the rate 
of ÇI.
Stimulus Redundancy 
Shannon and Weaver (1949) In outlining their theory of communi­
cation defined redundancy as follows :
One minus the relative entropy Is called redundancy. This 
Is the fraction of the structure of the message which Is determined 
not by the free choice of the sender, but rather by the accepted 
statistical rules governing the use of the symbols In question.
It Is sensibly called redundancy. . . that Is to say, this 
fraction of the message Is unnecessary (and hence repetitive 
or redundant) In the sense that If It were missing the message 
would still be essentially complete, or at least could be 
completed [1949, p. 104].
Furthermore, Garner (1962) has pointed out that Information theory
techniques. In particular redundancy, have been applied to such areas
of psychological Investigation as perceptual discrimination, pattern
perception, language, and concept formation. —
Generally, the concept of redundancy has been experimentally
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defined in terms of the "amount" of redundancy and the "form" of 
redundancy. Amount of redundancy is defined as the number of stimulus 
patterns actually used relative to the total set of patterns generated 
by a given number of dimensions. Form of redundancy is defined as the 
particular patterns included, in order to make up a stimulus set, out 
of the total possible stimulus patterns that can be generated. Thus, 
for example, in a Cl task, an experimenter may select five dimensions 
along which the stimuli may vary with each dimension having two levels. 
In this case the total possible number of different stimuli that may be 
constructed is 2^ or 32 stimuli. Next, if the experimenter selects only 
four stimuli out of the 32 possible stimuli, then only two bivariate 
dimensions are necessary to generate the four independent stimulus 
events. In such a case, three of the five stimulus dimensions are 
present in the other two dimensions or in combinations of these two. 
Therefore, the amount of redundancy present is a function of the number 
of superfluous bivariate dimensions. In the sub-set of four, there are 
three bits of redundancy. The form of the redundancy may either be 
a direct contingency relationship, two redundant dimensions correlating 
perfectly with a third dimension, or an interaction contingency, a 
redundant variable correlating perfectly only through a combination of 
two other independent dimensions.
M ost of the early experimental studies investigating the role 
of redundancy upon performance developed out of pattern identification 
or perceptual discrimination studies (e.g. Bricker, 1955; Deese, 1956; 
Rappaport, 1957). Most of these studies have reported that redundancy 
facilitated rapid discrimination or identification of visual patterns.
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particularly in the presence of background noise (irrelevant information). 
It wasn't until Bourne and Haygood (1939, 1961) as well as Haygood and 
Bourne (1964), working within the mathematical model of Cl, that a 
series of studies using the concept of stimulus redundancy was reported. 
Initially, Bourne and Haygood (1959) conducted two experiments concerning 
the effects of stimulus redundancy in the relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions of a Cl task. In the first investigation, the authors 
hypothesized that increasing the number of redundant relevant cues 
should increase the proportion of relevant cues available for subjects' 
use and thereby facilitate performance. Redundancy was introduced by 
adding one or more dimensions in a completely correlated fashion (direct 
contingency) to another relevant binary stimulus dimension used as a 
minimum. For example, if color (red, blue) is the one minimum relevant 
dimension, redundancy is introduced by correlating perfectly another 
dimension (e.g. form) to color, such that squares are always blue and 
triangles are always red. Here, one does not need to know the form of 
a pattern if he knows its color, for in a certain sense form is 
completely determined by color. The design of the experiment called 
for six levels of redundant, relevant information and three levels of 
non-redundant, irrelevant information arranged factorally. Although 
the design was incomplete (not all levels of relevant redundant dimen­
sions were represented at levels of irrelevant dimensions), the results 
demonstrated that redundant relevant information improved concept 
learning performance and the amount of improvement increased with 
increasing noise or irrelevant information.
In the second experiment, redundancy was introduced into a
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set of irrelevant dimensions. Five levels of irrelevant, redundant 
information were combined with two levels of relevant information.
Â two choice and a four choice (two relevant bivariate dimensions) 
were employed in the investigation. The two choice problem was 
significantly easier than the four choice problem. Furthermore, as the 
number of irrelevant redundant dimensions increased, performance 
deteriorated; however, the inhibiting effect of irrelevant redundant 
dimensions was less than the effect obtained in comparable conditions of 
nonredundant irrelevant information.
In a follow-up study. Bourne and Haygood (1961) attempted to 
extend their findings by testing the effects of relevant redundant 
information in a noise free situation (no irrelevant information).
Seven levels of relevant redundant dimensions with no irrelevant 
dimensions were employed. The results indicated that relevant redundancy 
facilitates rather than inhibits performance.
Overall, the above studies by Bourne and Haygood are, in 
general, only concerned with the amount of redundancy. That is, fewer 
patterns than the total number possible were used in the above studies 
which is consistent with Gamer's (1962) definition of the amount of 
redundancy. Furthermore, the above studies were not concerned with the 
form of redundancy, although the particular form of redundancy used was 
the direct contingency type. However, as Gamer points out, there are 
many other forms of redundancy which may produce differential effects 
on performance, irrespective of any concomitant variation in the 
amount of redundancy.
As Gamer (1962) suggests redundancy can be established by
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interactions or combinations of dimensions. That is, redundancy could 
be established through a combination of one or more relevant or irrele­
vant dimensions. With this in mind, Haygood and Bourne (1964) explored 
the effects of two forms of relevant stimulus redundancy within a 
conjunctive concept identification problem (four response categories). 
Conventionally, such four-response problems have a unique solution in 
two binary dimensions, produced by the four conjunctive combinations 
of levels within the designated relevant dimensions. Within this frame­
work, Haygood and Bourne introduced the two different forms of redundancy 
as follows : (1) Form A redundancy was established by correlating
perfectly a third dimension with one of the initially relevant conjunctive 
dimensions. This is similar to the relevant redundancy situation estab­
lished in previous studies (Bourne and Haygood, 1959, 1961). (2) Form
2  redundancy was established by correlating the levels of a third 
dimension with a combination (interaction) of both the initially relevant 
conjunctive dimensions. Furthermore, two control conditions were set 
up whereby the total number of patterns in the population was the same 
as in the redundancy conditions. Finally, these four types of relevant 
information (Form A, Control II) were varied independently along 
with increasing irrelevant information. The results not only confirmed 
Bourne and Haygood's (1959) previous study, but confirms Gamer's (1962) 
expectation about the reliable difference between two forms of redundancy, 
independent of amount of redundancy. The results indicated that form A 
redundancy facilitated performance more than form Also, both types 
of redundancy improved performance over the two control conditions with 
control condition being better than control condition ^  in performance.
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Finally, it will be recalled that an interaction existed between the 
amount of redundancy and irrelevant information in the Bourne and 
Haygood study whereas in the 1964 study (Haygood and Bourne) no such 
.interaction between form of redundancy and irrelevant information was 
found.
A few studies have concentrated more on response variables in 
a Cl task involving stimulus redundancy situations. Peterson (1962) 
as well as Trabasso, Bower, Gelman, and Schaeffer (1966) report that with 
increasing degrees of relevant stimulus redundancy (direct contingency), 
subjects did not reliably report more than one relevant dimension for 
solving the problems. However, as redundancy increased, most subjects 
reported at least one correct dimension more frequently. Thus, it appears 
as though the subjects were focusing more on only one dimension.
In summary, it can be noted that this review of stimulus 
redundancy within the concept learning framework is not exhaustive; 
yet, in every case the effect is unambiguous. Indeed, relevant 
stimulus redundancy facilitates performance, particularly in the presence 
of noise (irrelevant information). Finally, Evans (1967) suggests, 
theoretically, that concept learning can be viewed as follows: the
experimenter can be represented as the source and encoder of informa­
tion, the patterns presented to the subject are represented as signals 
in the communication channel, and the subject is represented as the 
decoder. The advantage being that the uncertainty of the channel, 
measured in bits per signal or per pattern, may be much greater than 
the uncertainty of the subject's responses. Thus, the subject may 
reduce and refine the information it receives. If the channel contains
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redundancy or a combination of redundancy and noise, these may partly 
or wholly be removed by the subject, so that his output has fewer 
states than does the channel.
Schizophrenics. Redundancy, and Cl
Relatively few studies have directly compared the performance 
of schizophrenics and normals on a ÇI task. Most of the studies have 
been concerned with the effect and/or manipulation of social cues in the 
experimental setting (e.g. Pishkin and Blanchard, 1963). However, recent 
Cl studies (Pishkin and Bourne, in press; Lydecker, 1966) have suggested
(a) that normals utilize more of the relevant stimulus information and 
leam at a faster rate than do schizophrenics, and (b) that schizophrenics 
tend to make more errors than normals as complexity increases. Further­
more, an extensive review of the literature has failed to reveal the 
utilization of the concept of stimulus redundancy in a concept learning 
task involving schizophrenics. Yet, evidence is available which suggests 
that redundancy has a differential effect upon information processing 
by schizophrenics depending upon the type of task employed.
Lawson, McGhie, and Chapman (1964) as well as Nidorf (1964) 
reported evidence that schizophrenics are able to repeat sentences of 
low redundancy (no contextual constraint) equally as well as normals, 
but schizophrenics do not improve to the same extent as normals when 
redundancy is increased. Lawson et concluded that it was the 
inability of the schizophrenics to screen out or filter the redundant 
words, which occur in most verbal communications, and, therefore, 
resulted in an overloading of the short-term memory system. Althougjh
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the finding of this study was interpreted by the authors within the 
framework of a faulty attention mechanism, it does make contact with 
the findings on overinclusion in schizophrenics. Overinclusion is 
the tendency of schizophrenics to include irrelevancies in their 
concepts. In this respect, the schizophrenics in the Lawson et al. 
study may have been too overinclusive to ignore the distracting effects 
of the redundant words which consequently lead to a breakdown in 
information processing. Finally, recent studies (Payne et al., 1959; 
McGhie, 1966} have concluded that faulty attention, not overinclusion, 
is the fundamental cognitive defect in schizophrenia.
Other evidence points to the fact that redundancy of infor­
mation facilitates rather than inhibits performance of schizophrenics 
on a variety of different tasks. Johannsen and Testin (1966) found that 
the basic perceptual functions of detection and stimulus identification 
are unimpaired by chronicity of schizophrenics under conditions of high 
stimulus redundancy. Furthermore, Pishkin, Smith, and Leibowitz (1962) 
as well as Pishkin (1966) found that schizophrenics with unlimited 
information performed on the same level as normals in a perceptual size 
judgment task. In each study, the schizophrenics tended to illuminate 
the perceptual field more often than did normals and thus required more 
redundant visual cues. Pishkin concludes by stating that:
Schizophrenic ^ s required more information, as reflected 
by their need to illuminate the field significantly more 
frequently than normal Ss before making a judgment. This 
particular finding supports original expectancies based on 
the notion schizophrenics' channel capacity is deficient 
and that schizophrenic ^  may be more distractable and unable 
to utilize cues as effectively as normals [1966, p. 6].
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In summararlzlng this work, several facts seem to emerge.
First, although schizophrenics are capable of forming and identifying 
concepts, their performance tends to be poorer than normals, particularly 
as irrelevant information increases. Secondly, schizophrenics utilize 
less relevant stimulus information than do normals. Finally, redundancy 
of information seems to facilitate encoding of information, particularly 
in the presence of noise or irrelevant information. However, there does 
not appear to be unequivocal evidence for this last generalization. In 
some cases where noise or irrelevant information is absent, redundancy 
may inhibit the encoding of information (Rappaport, 1957; Lawson et al., 
1964).
If these statements have any validity, then it would seem 
important to investigate the effect of stimulus redundancy in the iden­
tification of concepts by schizophrenics. That is, if a conceptual 
deficit in schizophrenia is due to an inability to screen out irrelevant 
information such that the primary processing channel is overloaded, then 
it would seem that redundancy of information may provide an effective 
for Overcoming perturbation in a stimulus brought on by noise or 
irrelevant information in a communication channel. In this sense 
relevant redundant information should provide additional cues for the 
schizophrenic to utilize in order to improve his efficiency in processing 
information. That is, in those situations where additional cues help 
the schizophrenic individual to overcome the distracting influences of 
irrelevant information or noise present in the stimulus, his performance 
on processing information would be more efficient. This has been demon­
strated with normals (Bourne and Haygood, 1959, 1961). However, even
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though the schizophrenic's performance should improve, there is reason 
to doubt that his performance would reach the same level as the normal 
subject due to the possible distracting effects of the redundant cues 
or surplus information (Lawson et al., 1964).
CHAPTER III
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
The basic problem of the present investigation is the lack 
of understanding of the process by which schizophrenics identify 
concepts. More specifically, "Does the nature of the information to 
be processed influence the schizophrenic's capacity to identify concepts?" 
"How does the schizophrenic's approach to identifying concepts differ 
from the normal, if it does differ?" The attempt to answer the above 
questions has led to the investigation of four general areas. These 
areas are: (1) investigation of a conceptual deficit in schizophrenia,
(2) the role of redundant information in information processing,
(3) hypothesis behavior, and (4) concept identification.
First, the investigation of higher thought processes 
(conceptual behavior) has always been a prime objective in the study 
of schizophrenia. Such recent investigators as McGhie and Chapman 
(1962, 1963, 1964), Yates (1966b), and Buss and Lang (1965) can be 
mentioned to illustrate this area. These authors place emphasis upon 
impaired selective attention, on inability to process incoming informa­
tion efficiently, and on abnormally slow rate of processing information 
as to the nature of this conceptual deficit.
A second area of investigation in the present study concerns
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the nature of the incoming information to be processed. The role of 
irrelevant information as well as redundant information has been clearly 
demonstrated in the information processing by normals (Bourne, 1957;
Bourne and Haygood, 1959, 1961). However, in terms of the schizophrenic's 
processing, the relationships are more equivocal. Indeed, the role of 
redundancy has been demonstrated to have both a facilitating and/or an 
inhibiting effect upon information processing in schizophrenics. Such 
discrepant results point out differences in theoretical interpretation. 
Does redundant information act as a source of distraction or does redun­
dant information facilitate transmission by reducing the potential amount 
of information to be transmitted?
There seem to be several questions regarding the present study 
which can be posed in the light of these two areas of investigation.
What is the role of irrelevant information in the schizophrenic's 
capacity to process information and identify abstract concepts? Further­
more, what is the effect of stimulus redundancy in the schizophrenic's 
capacity to process information in the identification of abstract 
concepts? That is, does redundancy improve the schizophrenic's processing 
of information, especially in the presence of noise or irrelevant infor­
mation or does redundancy act as an additional source of distraction 
which may impair performance, particularly in the presence of no irre­
levant information?
The third area of investigation concerns the more efficient 
use of relevant information by normals in the identification of concepts 
as cosq>ared to schizophrenics (Pishkin and Bourne, in press). That is, 
does the normal person utilize an approach which differs from the schizo­
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phrenic in the processing of information and identifying of abstract 
concepts? Thus, Bourne (1965) in trying to develop a more complete 
description and understanding of human conceptual behavior by 
the subject's hypothesis behavior in relation to his category responses, 
reported that there were significant differences between more efficient 
and less efficient learners.
Finally, the attempt to answer these questions brings one to 
the fourth general area of investigation: the investigation of the role 
of stimulus redundancy, hypothesis behavior, and concept identification 
in normal subjects using standardized and quantifiable procedures. This 
area of investigation involves a combination of information theory 
principles and mathematical model approaches. That is, the specific 
model which antecedes the present experiment is that of Bourne and 
Restle (1959). Among the many experiments stimulated by this model, 
only a few have investigated redundancy and hypothesis behavior in 
concept identification (Bourne and Haygood, 1959, 1961; Haygood and 
Bourne, 1964; Bourne, 1965).
Present Study
The purposes of the present study are to investigate the 
performance of schizophrenics and normals in the identification of 
abstract concepts involving relevant stimulus redundancy and increasing 
irrelevant information (complexity), and to investigate the hypothesis 
behavior of these subject groups in relation to category responses and 
overall performance.
Of the main variables taken into consideration, one of the
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most reliable features of the concept identification work is the system­
atic manipulation of the difficulty level by increasing irrelevant 
information. In the Cl model, a systematic manipulation of problem 
complexity can be defined independent of the subject's behavior. 
Furthermore, the complexity variable has been shown to influence the 
nature of information processing. In other words, the more the irrelevant 
information, the greater the inhibiting effect upon solution.
The second variable employed in the present study which has 
been shown to influence information processing and solution on Cl 
problems is that of relevant stimulus redundancy. In ÇI work, relevant 
stimulus redundancy can be defined independent of the subject's behavior. 
In the present study, the form of the redundancy was defined as the 
perfect correlation (direct contingency) of the levels of two or more 
dimensions. Finally, relevant stimulus redundancy has been shown to 
influence the nature of information processing on a ÇI task. That is, 
redundancy facilitates information processing, particularly as irrelevant 
information increases. However, this has been demonstrated for normal 
subjects only. There have been no studies reported that have attempted 
to investigate the effect of relevant stimulus redundancy on Cl problems 
involving a schizophrenic population. Thus, in addition to complexity 
and redundancy variables, the present study employed a group variable 
involving the use of schizophrenic patients.
The following main hypotheses were tested:
Considering the findings and assumptions of Chapman and McGhie 
(1963, 1964) as well as McGhie and Chapman (1965) that schizophrenics 
have an impaired selective attention, an inability to process incoming
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Information efficiently, and a marked inability to attend selectively 
to stimuli in such a way that only relevant information is processed 
it was hypothesized that:
1. A significantly greater number of Cl errors will be observed 
in the schizophrenic group than in the normal control group.
Due to the consistent findings that complexity in a Cl task 
results in a greater increase in errors (Bourne, 1957; Pishkin, 1960) 
it is expected that:
2. With increasing irrelevant dimensions (complexity), a 
greater number of Cl errors will be expected in both groups.
According to McGhie and Chapman's formulation, schizophrenics 
tend to make a greater number of errors due to the distraction and over­
loading of increasing irrelevant information than do their normal counter­
parts. Furthermore, Pishkin and Bourne (in press) on a ÇI task found 
that performance became progressively poorer when irrelevant information 
increased, especially the performance of schizophrenic subjects.
Assuming the above to be the case, it was hypothesized that:
3. With increasing irrelevant dimensions a relatively 
greater number of Cl errors will result in the schizophrenic 
group as compared to the normal group.
In the Bourne and Haygood (1959, 1961) studies, where relevant 
redundancy was defined as the perfect correlation between two relevant 
dimensions, performance in the identification of abstract concepts 
improved when relevant redundancy was introduced into the ÇI problems. 
Considering this finding, it was hypothesized that:
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4. Increasing relevant redundancy will lead to improved Cl 
performance (less Cl errors) in both groups.
In addition, the Bourne and Haygood studies found that with 
redundancy the amount of improvement increased as the amount of irrele­
vant information increased, although this finding is not unequivocal 
(Haygood and Bourne, 1964). Here, it was hypothesized that:
5. Due to the hypothesized improved performance with the 
introduction of redundancy, an interaction between complexity
and relevant redundancy is also expected; with relevant redundancy 
performance improving more as there is an increase in complexity.
According to Lawson et (1964), redundant elements of a 
stimulus may act as distractors for schizophrenics whereby their per­
formance may be impaired, particularly with increasing redundant cues. 
In this sense, the stimulus patterns increase in complexity even though 
the same amount of information is transmitted. However, there is 
evidence that redundancy of information facilitates the schizophrenic's 
performance, particularly in the presence of irrelevant information 
(Johannsen and Testin, 1966; Pishkin, 1966). Furthermore, in the Cl 
model relevant redundant cues increase the number of relevant cues and 
leads to improved performance (Bourne and Haygood, 1959). On the basis 
of such evidence, it is expected that:
6. The schizophrenic group will be expected to make more Cl 
errors than the normal group as redundancy increases, even though 
their performance should improve with redundancy, particularly
In the presence of irrelevant information.
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Due to the findings of Bourne (1965) that there are signifi­
cant differences between more efficient learners and less efficient 
learners in terms of their hypothesis behavior in relation to category 
responses it was hypothesized that:
7. Normal subjects will start with a more encompassing 
initial hypothesis, keep the same hypothesis after a correct 
response more.frequently, and be more consistent with previously 
presented information than will schizophrenic subj ects.
CHAPTER IV
METHOD
Subjects
The subjects in the present investigation were patients from 
the Veterans Administration Hospital, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Fifty 
male schizophrenic patients and 50 male normals were selected against 
a strict criterion (Appendix 1). Schizophrenic patients were drawn 
from both the inpatient wards and the day hospital units. Table 1 
contains the diagnostic categories of the schizophrenic patients and 
the number of subjects in each category that participated in the present 
study. The control group was drawn from the orthopedic, general medical, 
and surgical wards of the hospital. Table 2 contains the distribution 
of hospital wards for normal patients and the number of subjects from 
each ward that participated in the study.
Table 1 
Diagnostic Categories
Number of Subjects Diagnosis
1 acute undifferentiated
1 catatonic
15 paranoid
33 chronic undifferentiated
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Table 2
Distribution of Normal Patients
Number of Subjects Ward
17 Orthopedic
21 General Medical
12 Surgical
The mean age for the schizophrenic group was 38.84 years, 
and for the normal group 38.46 years. A jt-test indicated that this was 
not a significant difference. The mean educational level of the schizo­
phrenic group was 11.0 years and for the normal group, 10.7 years.
Again, a t^test indicated no significant difference.
Design
The experimental design was an incomplete 4 x 4 x 2  factorial: 
four levels of irrelevant (nonredundant) information, 0, 2, 4, and 6 
irrelevant dimensions; four levels of relevant and redundant information, 
1, 3, 5, and 7 dimensions ; and two groups, schizophrenics and normals.
The design is incomplete since not all levels of relevant information 
are represented at all levels of irrelevant information. The design 
was incomplete due to the fact that in practice only seven dimensions 
are equally salient for the subject. The stimulus dimensions used as 
relevant and irrelevant appear in Appendix II. Each subject performed 
individually and the dependent variables relevant to the factorial 
design were errors, trials to solution, talk time, and hypothesis
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behavior in relation to category responses.
Apparatus and Task
The apparaca^ is similar to that used by Wolfgang (1965).
It consisted of an 8 x 12 inch opaque screen mounted on a 4 x 4 x 8 
foot panel paintedT)lack. The panel screen was enclosed by a soundproof 
cubicle with a top and two sides. It was 63 inches high, 36 inches 
from front to back, and 48 inches in width. The stimulus instances of 
the concept were back-projected onto the screen by a Dunning Animatic 
16 mm strip-film projector. The screen was situated at eye level on 
the panel, and just below this panel the subject's response panel is 
located. The ^s response panel contained seven hypothesis buttons and 
a correction button. The seven hypothesis buttons were labeled according 
to each of the stimulus dimensions (Appendix II) and the order of their 
appearance was randomized after every twenty subjects. The correction 
button was unlabeled and was of a different color from the seven dimen­
sion buttons. Immediately above the dimension buttons and correction 
button were two larger response category keys, identified by the letters 
A and B. Finally, positioned directly above each category response key 
was a small amber feedback light.
Behind and to one side of the subject's cubicle containing the 
screen and response panel was the jE's control panel. This control 
panel was electronically connected to the ^ s panel and contained 
seven dimension lights, two category lights, and two feedback keys. In 
addition, an Esterline-Angus 20-pen operations recorder was electronically 
connected to both the experimenter's and subject's panel board to record
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the subject's responses and the experimenter's feedback. In addition, 
the Esterline-Angus was connected to a throat microphone.in conjunction 
with a noise operated relay (Hunter model 320s) which, when activated, 
automatically recorded each subject's frequency and duration of vocal 
and subvocal activity.
The subject's task was basically to solve a two-choice Cl 
problem by categorizing a series of geometric patterns in accordance with 
a relevant dimension. In addition, the subject was to give his hypothe­
sis on each trial by selecting one or more of the stimulus buttons he 
felt were correct for solution to the problem. The task was self-paced 
in that the subject progressed at his own rate.
Procedure
Upon their arrival at the experiment ^s were administered 
the vocabulary and abstract portions (scores are in Appendix IV) of 
the Shipley Institute of Living Scale (Shipley, 1940). This test was 
administered by jE in a small anteroom across from the main experimental 
room. All Ss were then ushered into the soundproof Cl room and seated 
inside the cubicle (used to reduce apparatus noise). The cubicle was 
so arranged that the subject could clearly view only the screen and 
response panel. The throat microphone was placed around the subject's 
neck and the instructions were read to him (Appendix III). After 
instructing the subject as to the nature of the task, the meaning of the 
feedback lights, and the manipulation of the response controls, Z returned 
to his control panel and began the examples and the experiment proper.
The experimental task was begun by having the subj ect view
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a geometric pattern projected on the screen directly in front of him 
and at eye level. After a self-determined time, the subject responded 
by pressing one or more stimulus dimension buttons (Hypothesis) and by 
pressing one of the two category response keys. The depressed stimulus 
dimension button or buttons initiated a signal or signals that triggered 
corresponding lights on the experimenter's panel and which recorded the 
^'s choice or choices on the chart of the Esterline-Angus recorder.
The depressed stimulus dimension buttons stayed in a down position 
(continuous signal) until the subject pressed one of the two category 
response keys. When the subject pressed one of the two category keys, 
a light (A or ^ ) on the experimenter's panel indicated the subject's 
choice; then the experimenter, using a planned program of information 
feedback coordinated with the filmstrip programming, depressed a key 
which lit up one of the amber feedback lights (A or B^) on the subject's 
panel for approximately one second, indicating to the subject the 
correctness of his response. Both the subject's category response and 
feedback were recorded on the Esterline-Angus recorder. In addition, 
as the subject depressed one of the category keys, the stimulus dimen­
sion button or buttons returned to their original ready position.
Finally, as ^  depressed the appropriate feedback key, for approximately 
1 second, an electronic timer was triggered which automatically advanced 
the filmstrip to a blank frame for 4 seconds, and then to the next 
geometric pattern allowing the subject to start another trial after 
his last response. Criterion to solution for all subjects was 16 con­
secutive correct responses or a maximum of 192 trials.
Ten strip-filmed series of patterns were used; four each had
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one relevant dimension and either 0, 2, 4, or 6 irrelevant dimensions; 
three had 0 irrelevant dimensions and either 3, 5, or 7 relevant redundant 
dimensions ; and the last three had a combination of 3 or 5 relevant 
redundant dimensions and 2 or 4 irrelevant dimensions (Appendix II). The 
relevant dimension is that property of the pattern, which, when identified 
by the subject, enables him to press the appropriate category key as well 
as state the appropriate hypothesis for a correct solution. An irrele­
vant dimension had a zero correlation with the correct response. When 
a particular dimension was neither relevant nor irrelevant, it appeared 
without variation at only one of its two levels within a given series. 
Redundancy was introduced by adding one or more dimensions in a completely 
correlated fashion (direct contingency) to another relevant binary 
stimulus dimension used as a minimum. For instance, if color and form 
are relevant and redundant, then squares are always red and triangles are 
always blue. Finally, it should be noted that the stimulus dimensions 
were always available to the subject. In this way, Pishkin (1965) has 
shown that not only does performance on a Cl task improve, but apparently 
the availability of the dimensions serves to limit the number of possible 
hypotheses the subjects must consider.
Following the above experimental procedure, each ^  was given 
the following psychometric test:
Test of Behavioral Rigidity (Schaie, 1955)
Since it has been demonstrated that schizophrenics in compari­
son to normals manifest certain response sets such as position bias or 
perserveration tendencies as well as being more rigid on a conceptual
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task (Fey, 1954), it was felt that the inclusion of a measure of 
behavioral rigidity, in order to correlate such measures with Cl 
performance and hypothesis behavior, would be appropriate. This 
instrument yields three measures: (a) motor-cognitive rigidity,
(b) personality-perceptual rigidity, and (c) psychomotor speed.
CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Since the Instructions stressed accuracy, the number of errors 
was the main dependent variable. However, upon inspection of the data, 
it was noted that variance differences for the error scores in the 
normal and schizophrenic groups were quite large. Cochran's test of 
homogenity (Winer, 1962) revealed that for normal's (£ » .916, df =4,
2  <.01) and schizophrenic's (C^  « 1.081, ^  = 4, 2  <*01) error scores, 
there was significant heterogeneity. Due to the marked heterogeneity 
(the difference between the largest and smallest variance was well over 
100), a log transformation upon all error scores was performed which 
resulted in homogeneity of variance.
Analysis of Error Scores 
The structure of the design necessitated several statistical 
analyses in order to determine the significance of the relevant redun­
dant information source, the population source, and the complexity 
source. In accordance, analyses of variance were computed at each 
level of irrelevant information, at the one relevant dimension level, 
on six groups with 1 or 3 relevant dimensions and 0, 2, or 4 irrelevant 
dimensions, and on six groups with 1, 3, or 5 relevant dimensions and 
0, or 2 irrelevant dimensions. The results of these analyses are
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shown in Table 3.
As expected, the main effects of relevant redundant dimensions 
(R) was significant. This indicated that with cooq>lexity (£) and popu­
lations (£) pooled, fewer log mean errors were made with the introduc­
tion of redundant dimensions. At the 0 and 2 irrelevant dimension 
level, the number of R dimensions were significant (section A and £  of 
Table 3) beyond the .03 level, but with 4 irrelevant dimensions the 
number of R dimensions was significant (section £) beyond the .001 
level. Furthermore, an analysis performed on the six groups with 1 or 
3 relevant dimensions and 0, 2, or 4 irrelevant dimensions (section £) 
revealed a significant R x £  interaction (F = 5.009, 2 and 48 df,
2  <.05). This indicated, as does Figure 1, that with the introduction 
of redundant dimensions fewer log mean errors occurred and the amount 
of decrease in errors was greater as the number of irrelevant dimensions 
increased. Subsequent analysis with Duncan's (1955) multiple range 
test revealed that at each level of irrelevant information the greatest 
log mean errors were produced on the one relevant dimension condition as 
compared to the relevant redundant dimension conditions ( ^  > 32, £  <.05; 
df ■ 24, 2  <.05; df ■ 16, £  <«001 respectively). At the 0 and 2 levels 
of complexity, no significant differences were manifested between rele­
vant redundant conditions (df ■ 32, £  >.05; df ■ 24, £  >.05 respectively) 
It is interesting to note that the R x £  interaction was found only in 
the analysis performed on the six groups involving 1 and 3 relevant 
dimensions and 0, 2, or 4 irrelevant dimensions (section F). The 
R X £  interaction in the analysis on the six groups involving 1, 3, or 
5 relevant dimensions and 0 and 2 irrelevant dimensions was not signifi-
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance of Log Errors 
(Relevant Redundancy [R], Complexity [C], Population [P])
Source ^  ^ F 2
(SECTION A) - 0 irrelevant information level
R 3 .32904 3.823 .05
(Linear) 1 .31371 3.650 .07
(Quadratic) 1 .58389 6.784 .05
P 1 .16137 1.875 NS
RP 3 .11410 1.325 NS
Error 32 .08607
(SECTION B^) - 2 irrelevant dimension level
R 2 1.581 4.489 .05
(Linear) 1 2.599 7.379 .05
(Quadratic) 1 .56302 1.598 NS
P 1 1.186 3.367 .09
RP 2 .004
Error 24 .352
(SECTION ^) - 4 irrelevant dimension level
R 1 7.8494 96.882 .001
P 1 .7609 9.392 .01
RP 1 .1120 1.382 NS
Error 16 .08102
(SECTION D) - 6 irrelevant dimension level
P 1 .97363 7.646 .05
Error
(Table 3 continued on next page)
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Table 3 —  continued
Source âL MS F 2
(SECTION ^) - 1 relevant dimension level
C 3 3.71739 20.360 .001
(Linear) 1 9.525 52.167 .001
(Quadratic) 1 1.02947 5.638 .05
P 1 1.23633 6.771 .05
CP 3 .1309 --
Error 32 .18258
(SECTION F) - 0, 2, or 4 irrelevant dimension levels and 1, or 3
relevant dimension levels
C 2 3.870 20.395 .001
(Linear) 1 7.73326 40.751 .001
(Quadratic) 1 .00764
R 1 8.8898 46.845 .001
P 1 1.10498 5.823 .05
CR 2 .95065 5.009 .05
CP 1 .236 1.244 NS
RP 1 .0017
CRP 2 .0749
Error 48 .18977
(SECTION G) - 0, or 2 irrelevant dimension levels and 1, 3, or 5
relevant dimension levels
C 1 1.68964 8.294 .01
R 2 1.90043 9.328 .001
(Linear) 1 2.90919 14.280 .001
(Quadratic) 1 .89165 4.377 .05
P 1 .67138 3.295 .09
CR 2 .17175
CP 1 .51937 2.549 NS
RP 2 .01736
CRP 2 .00283
Error 48 .20373
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Figure 1. Mean log errors for 0, 2, and 4 irrelevant dimensions 
at different levels of relevant dimensions. (Irrelevant dimensions 
by relevant dimensions with groups pooled.) Each point represents 
an N of 10.
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cant (section 6). Overall, the results regarding the R main effect 
and the R x Interaction are consistent with the findings obtained 
by Bourne and Haygood (1959; 1961).
As expected, the main effect was significant (section E).
This Indicated, as does Figure 2, that as the amount of Irrelevant 
Information Increased, log mean errors progressively Increased up to 
the four Irrelevant dimension level. Subsequent analysis with Duncan's 
(1955) test Indicated that there were significant differences In mean 
errors between complexity levels 6 and 2 ( ^  » 32, £  <.01), 6 and 0 
(df * 32, 2  <"01), 4 and 2 ( ^  = 32, £  <.01), 4 and 0 ( ^  = 32, £  <.01),
2 and 0 ( ^  = 32, £  <.01), but not between 6 and 4 ( ^  32, £  >.01).
Orthogonal polynomial analyses computed for the R main effect 
and the £  main effect reveal Interesting differences In the performances 
of normals and schizophrenics. In terms of the R main effect, trend 
analysis at the 0 complexity level (section A) revealed a significant 
guadratlc component (£ = 6.784, 1 and 32 df, £  <.05) accounting for 
59% of the variance and a linear component which did not quite reach 
significance (£ = 3.645, 1 and 32 df, £  <.07) that accounted for 32% 
of the variance. However, at the 2 complexity level (section B) only 
the linear component reached significance (F = 7.379, 1 and 24 df,
£  <.05). The reason for such findings Is that at the 0 level of 
complexity. Figure 3, normal's performance continues to Improve, reaching 
0 errors In the 7 relevant redundant condition, whereas schizophrenic's 
performance becomes progressively Inferior as relevant redundancy 
Increases beyond 3 relevant redundant dimensions. A £-test between 
normals and schizophrenics In the 7 relevant redundant condition
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58
approached significance (_t » 1.616, 8 £<.08), indicating that
schizophrenics had a tendency to make more errors. In terms of the £  
main effect, trend analysis at the 1 relevant dimension level (section £) 
revealed a significant linear component (£ » 52.167, 1 and 32 df, £  <.001) 
accounting for 85% of the variance as well as a significant quadratic 
component (£ = 5.638, 1 and 32 df, £  < .05) accounting for 9% of the 
variance. As illustrated in Figure 4, both normals and schizophrenics 
show a linear increase in errors up to the 4 complexity level at which 
point normals show a decrease in errors. An analysis of variance com­
puted at the 6 irrelevant dimension level (section D) revealed a signi­
ficant difference between schizophrenics and normals with normals making 
less errors (£ = 7.646, 1 and 3 df, £<.05). In general, the significance 
of the £  source was somewhat consistent with the results obtained by 
several previous Cl investigators (Archer, Bourne, and Brown, 1955;
Bourne, 1957; Pishkin, 1960; Bum, 1967).
In terms of the significance of the population (P) source, 
results in Table 3 indicate significant £  main effects at the 4 and 6 
levels of irrelevant information (section £  and £), at the 1 relevant 
dimension level (section E), and in the six groups with 1 or 3 relevant 
dimensions and 0, 2, or 4 irrelevant dimensions (section £). In each 
case schizophrenics had larger log mean errors than normals, but only 
at the higher levels of complexity (4 and 6 irrelevant dimensions). 
Although the hypothesized £  x £  and R x £  interactions were not 
significant (Table 3), Figures 5 and 3 indicate that schizophrenics 
had a tendency to make more Cl errors than do normals as complexity 
increased. Furthermore, schizophrenics do not benefit from relevant
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redundancy as much as normals, particularly with 0 irrelevant dimensions. 
Finally, a t-test computed on the 3 relevant redundant and 4 irrelevant 
dimension conditions (Figure 5) revealed that schizophrenics make 
significantly more errors than normals * 2.71, 8 df, 2  <«05). Thus, 
even though the schizophrenic's performance improved with redundancy in 
the presence of irrelevant information, there still was a tendency for 
him to make more errors.
Analysis of Trials
Due to the marked heterogeneity of variance, the log^g of the 
number of errors per block of 16 trials plus 1 served as the transformed 
score and was used in the analysis of variance. In accordance with the 
structure of the design, several analyses of variance were performed 
following the format of the error analyses. The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 4.
In each analysis of Table 4 the 2  main effect was significant 
beyond the .001 level. This indicated that log mean errors progressively 
decreased over trial blocks. The 2  main effect is further elaborated 
by certain interactions. First, the significant x 2  interaction 
(section 2  of Table 4), as does Figure 6, indicates that as complexity 
increases the number of trials increased. Secondly, the significant 
2  X R interaction (section Â, 2> G), as does Figure 7, suggests
that with increasing relevant redundancy fewer trials occurred as 
compared to the 1 relevant dimension level (no redundancy). Finally, 
the significant 2  * 2  % R interactions (section 2  and G) emphasizes 
the significant trends found in the 2  ^  £  and 2  ^  £  interaction terms.
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance of Log Trials (T)
Source df MS F 2
(SECTION A) - 0 irrelevant level
T 11 .15232 65.370 .001
TR 33 .03213 13.789 .001
TP 11 .01081 4.64 .01
TRP 33 .01098 4.712 .01
Error 352 .00233
(SECTION B) - 2 irrelevant level
T 11 .2364 10.814 .001
TR 22 .03561 1.629 .05
TP 11 .01661
TRP 22 .02140
Error 264 .02186
(SECTION C) - 4 irrelevant level
T 11 .40966 10.671 .001
TR 11 .10457 2.724 .01
TP 11 .01998
TRP 11 .09029 2.3519 .05
Error 176 .03839
(SECTION D) - 6 irrelevant level
T 11 .1084 3.589 .001
TP 11 .09134 3.024 .001
Error 88 .03020
(Table 4 continued on next page)
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Table 4 - continued
Source Ü F 2
(SECTION E) - 1 relevant dimension level
T 11 .64004 18.461 .001
TC 33 .05353 1.544 .05
TP 11 .07032 2.028 .05
TCP 33 .04060 1.171 NS
Error 352 .03467
(SECTION F) - 0, 2, or 4 irrelevant dimension levels and 1 or 3
relevant dimension levels
T 11 .62185 27.961 .001
TC 22 .04968 2.234 .01
TR 11 .09553 4.295 .001
TP 11 .00704
TCR 22 .06508 2.926 .01
TCP 22 .01453
TRP 11 .02979 1.34 NS
TCRP 22 .04097 1.842 .05
Error 528 .02224
(SECTION G) - 0 or 2 irrelevant dimension levels and 1, 3, or 5
relevant dimension levels
T 11 .34467 26.032 .001
TC 11 .02736 2.066 .05
TR 22 .05182 3.914 .001
TP 11 .00937
TCR 22 .02217 1.674 .05
TCP 11 .00792
TRP 22 .01390 1.0498 NS
TCRP 22 .01089
Error 528 .01324
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It Is noteworthy that over trial blocks learning becomes progressively 
slower when there is increasing irrelevant dimensions and no redundant 
dimensions (1 relevant dimension) whereas learning improves when relevant 
redundancy is introduced, particularly in the presence of irrelevant 
information.
In terms of learning curves, Figures 8 and 9 show normal's 
and schizophrenic's learning curves in each of the ten conditions. As 
expected, normals (Figure 8) performed consistently better on those 
conditions which involved relevant redundancy. Furthermore, the learning 
curves of the normals improved consistently as the number of redundant 
dimensions exceeded the number of irrelevant dimensions. On the other 
hand, schizophrenic's (Figure 9) performance was less facilitated by 
redundancy. In fact, schizophrenics performed poorer as the patterns 
became more complex (actual stimulus uncertainty) either by adding 
irrelevant dimensions or redundant dimensions. Additional support can 
be found in Table 4 where several 2 * 2  interactions were significant.
First, at the 0 irrelevant information level (section A) a 
significant %  x jP interaction (F * 4.64, 352 £  < .01) indicates that
schizophrenics performed poorer than normals across all blocks of trials, 
particularly on the first two blocks. Furthermore, a significant 
2  X R X 2  interaction (£ » 4.71, 352 df, £  < .01) emphasizes the trend 
in the T x 2  interaction. It is noteworthy that the schizophrenic's 
poorer performance resulted from the 7 relevant redundant condition 
in which their log mean errors were x = .43166 as compared to the 
normal's x = 0.00. At the 4 irrelevant level (section 2)* Figure 10 
illustrates the significant trends found in the 2  R x 2  interaction
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(F ■ 2.35, 176 2  <«05). As can be seen normals perform consistently
better than schizophrenics at both the 1 and 3 relevant dimension levels, 
even though both group's performances improve as redundancy increases. 
However, perhaps the clearest demonstration that schizophrenics have 
difficulty in identifying concepts with increasing irrelevant informa­
tion is illustrated in Figure 11. As can be seen, at the 6 irrelevant 
dimension level, schizophrenics show no learning whatsoever as compared 
to the normal group. This is supported by a significant 2 * 2 .  inter­
action (jF = 3.024, 88 df, 2  <*001) at the 6 irrelevant level (section ^ ). 
Other support is found at the 1 relevant dimension level (section .
Here again, a significant T x 2  interaction (£ = 2.028, 352 2  <*05)
indicates that with complexity pooled normals consistently outperformed 
schizophrenics across all blocks of trials. Overall, the significant 
trends involving %, C, R, and 2  found in the several trial analyses 
are emphasized in the significant 2  x 2  x R 2  interaction term 
(2 = 1.842, 528 df, 2  ^  «05) found in the analysis performed on the six 
groups involving 1 or 3 relevant dimensions and 0, 2, or 4 irrelevant 
dimensions (section 2)* In this case. Figures 12 and 13, as well as 14 
(included for comparison only) show the learning curves for both popu­
lations at either the 0, 2, or 4 irrelevant levels for either the 1, 3, 
or 5 relevant dimension levels. It is interesting to note that at the 
1 relevant dimension level normals consistently outperform schizophrenics 
only with the introduction of irrelevant information; however, at the 
3 relevant dimension level, with the introduction of relevant redundancy, 
normals consistently reached solution on the second block of trials 
whereas schizophrenics did so only with no irrelevant information
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Figure 11. Mean log errors per block of 16 
trials for normals and schizophrenics as a function 
of 6 bits of irrelevant information. Each point 
represents an N of 5.
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present. Finally a similar pattern (Figure 14) is evident at the 5 
relevant dimension level.
Analysis of Subvocal and Vocal Activity
Analyses of variance of seconds of vocal activity (Table 5) 
were performed. Again, the log^g of the number of errors per block of 16 
trails plus 1 served as the transformed score.
In terms of task complexity, the results in section E of Table 
5 show a significant linear £  main effect (% = 14.193, 32 df, 2. <-001) 
indicating that vocal activity increased as the number of irrelevant 
dimensions increased. Subsequent Duncan's (1955) test revealed that 
there were significant differences in mean log talk time between com­
plexity levels 6 and 2 (32 df, £<.05), 6 and 0 (32 df, £<.05), 4 and 
2 (32 df, £  < .05), 4 and 0 (32 df, £<.05), 2 and 0 (32 df, £<.05), but 
not between 6 and 4 (32 df, £>.05). In addition to the significant £  
main effect, a significant £  main effect (£ = 6.193, 32 df, £  <.05) 
revealed that schizophrenics had a larger vocal activity time than 
normals. Furthermore, a significant £  x £  interaction (sections £  and 
£) indicated, as does Figure 15, that as the number of irrelevant dimen­
sions increased schizophrenics had a significantly larger vocal activity 
time as compared to normals. Subsequent analysis with Duncan's (1955) 
test revealed that at the 2 and 6 levels of irrelevant information schizo­
phrenics had significantly larger mean log talk times (df » 32, £<.05).
The significant: difference at the 6 complexity level between schizophrenics 
and normals receives additional support from an analysis of variance 
performed at that level (section D). Finally, schizophrenics increased
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance of Log Talk Time
Source df MS F 2
(SECTION A) - 0 irrelevant level
R 3 .302 1.39 NS
P 1 .132
EP 3 .286
Error 32 .218
(SECTION B) - 2 irrelevant level
R 2 .935 3.076 .07
P 1 .988 3.25 NS
RP 2 .483 1.59 NS
Error 24 .304
(SECTION Ç) - 4 irrelevant level
R 1 2.061 8.73 .01
P 1 .417 1.77 NS
RP 1 .245
Error 16 .236
(SECTION D) - 6 irrelevant level
P 1 1.528 7.35 .05
Error 8 .208
(Table 5 continued on next page)
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Table 5 - continued
Source Ü MS F 2
(SECTION E) - 1 relevant dimension level
C 3 2.498 14.193 .001
Linear 1 7.0224 39.9 .001
Quadratic 1 .2619 1.488 NS
Cubic 1 .2108 1.197 NS
P 1 1.09 6.193 .05
CP 3 .861 4.892 .01
Error 32 .176
(SECTION F) - 0, 2, and 4 irrelevant dimension levels and 1 and 3
relevant dimension levels
C 2 2.4535 10.423 .001
R 1 1.81 7.689 .01
P 1 .365 1.55 NS
CR 2 .393 1.67 NS
CP 2 1.1365 4.828 .05
RP 1 .009
CPR 2 .332 1.41 NS
Error 48 .2354
(SECTION G) - 0 and 2 irrelevant dimension levels and 1, 3, and 5
relevant dimension levels
R 2 .2885 1.25 NS
C 1 .063
P 1 .035
RC 2 .8305 3.611 .05
RP 2 .1325
CP 1 1.485 6.46 .05
RCP 2 .436 1.90 NS
Error 48 .230
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Figure 15. Mean log talk time In seconds for normals and 
schizophrenics as a function of different complexity levels with 
1 bit of relevant Information. Each point represents an N of 5.
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their mean log talk time significantly so from the 0 complexity to the 
2 complexity level, whereas normals increased from the 2 complexity to 
the 4 complexity level (df = 32, 2<  -05).
In terms of relevant redundancy, the analyses of variance 
performed at the 2 (section JB) and 4 (section O  irrelevant dimension 
levels revealed that the R main effect approached significance at the 
2 irrelevant levels (£ = 3.076, 24 £< .07) and reached significance
at the 4 irrelevant level (F^  » 8.73, .6 df. 2  Additional support
for the significant R main effect is found in section 2  (2 " 7.689,
48 df, 2  <»01)« Thus, as relevant redundancy is introduced, vocal acti­
vity decreased. Finally, the analysis of variance performed on the six 
conditions involving 1, 3, or 5 relevant dimensions and 0 or 2 irrelevant 
dimensions (section 6) revealed a significant R x 2  interaction (2 = 3.611, 
48 df, 2< »05). This R x interaction indicated, as does Figure 16, 
that as the number of relevant redundant dimensions increased vocal 
activity decreased and the amount of decrease was greater as the number 
of irrelevant dimensions increased. Subsequent simple effects analysis 
(Winer, 1962) revealed (Table 6) that there was a significant decrease 
in talk time across relevant dimensions at the 2 complexity level 
(df = 48, 2  <«01), but there was no difference in talk time across 
relevant dimensions at the 0 complexity level (df = 48, 2> *05). Further­
more, differences in mean log talk time between the 0 and 2 levels of 
complexity approached significance at the 1 and 5 relevant dimension 
levels (df = 48, 2  <«06).
When talk time was compared with number of errors, Pearson 2 's 
showed significant positive correlations for each population group
80
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Figure 16. Mean log talk time In seconds for the 0 and 2 
levels of complexity at 1, 3, and 5 relevant dimension levels. 
(Groups are pooled.) Each point represents an N of 10.
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Table 6
Simple Effects Analysis of Variance of 
Talk Time for R x Interaction 
(Section G of Table 5)
Source pa 2 "
RCq 1.595 NS
RC2 8.131 .01
CRi 3.60 .06
CR3 .66 NS
CR5 3.338 .06
NOTE: RCq » Relevant dimensions for 0 complexity level
RC2 = Relevant dimensions for 2 complexity level 
CR]^  = Complexity for 1 relevant dimension level 
CR3 = Complexity for 3 relevant dimension level 
CR5 » Complexity for 5 relevant dimension level
®MSE = .230 
bdf = 1/48
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(% * .562, ^  * 48, 2  <"001; 2  “ .765, ^  ■ 48, 2  <.001 for normals 
and schizophrenics respectively). Thus, verbal activity was positively 
related to errors in Cl performance for both population groups.
Analysis of Hypotheses and Hypothesis Shifts 
The analysis of hypothesis behavior in the present study was 
the same as that used by Bourne (1965). Ten basic characteristics of 
S_'s hypothesis behavior were determined: the number of dimensions in ^ 's 
initial hypothesis (%), the number of times 2  changed his hypothesis in 
any way after making an incorrect category response (EC), the number of 
times after an error that ^  did not change his hypothesis (EN), the num­
ber of times ^  changed his hypothesis after making a correct response (£), 
the number of times that ^  did not change his hypothesis after making 
a correct response (N), the addition (A) or deletion (D^ ) of dimensions 
from ^ 's hypothesis of the previous trial (Hypothesis shifts), increases 
in hypothesis size (A or A >D), decreases in hypothesis size (D or D> A), 
and changes in hypothesis composition only (A == D). These last five 
characteristics deal with ^'s hypothesis shifts from a previous trial. 
Except for 2» the frequency of each of the foregoing characteristics 
was converted to a proportion. This was done by dividing-each charac­
teristic by the total number of times that particular characteristic 
happened in the stimulus sequence shown to 2» For example, K  and C_ 
were divided by the total number of hypothesis changes displayed by 
(in addition, ^  and were divided by the total number of incorrect 
and correct responses, respectively, resulting in EC^, and Cj^ ); EN 
and N were divided by the total number of errors and correct responses
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respectively; and A, A >^, D >A, and A = 2  were divided by the 
total number of changes after error. Finally, the proportion of 
hypothesis shifts (of the various types) that were consistent with 
previously presented information given to ^  in the series were computed. 
Then the mean value for each of these proportions was determined separately 
for normal and schziophrenic subjects in each experimental conditions.
First of all, the analysis of the hypothesis behavior was 
conducted separately for normals and schizophrenics by pooling the ten 
main experimental conditions of relevant and irrelevant information 
(Table 7). However, since the source of relevant redundancy and 
irrelevant information proved to be significant in the analysis of 
errors, further analysis of hypothesis behavior was conducted at each 
level of irrelevant information (Table 8) and at each level of relevant 
redundant information (Table 9). In addition, a fourth analysis was 
conducted across those experimental conditions which involved the same 
amount of stimulus uncertainty (Table 10).
With irrelevant and relevant conditions pooled (Table 7), 
normal subjects stayed with a particular hypothesis when they were 
correct (^) more frequently than did schizophrenics (^ = 1.60, 98 df, 
£<.06), and they were n»re consistent with previously presented infor­
mation when they added a dimension (A) to their hypothesis (^ = 2.26,
98 df, 2  < «05). It is noteworthy that schizophrenics had higher per­
centages of shifts in their hypothesis after an error (EC^) and after a 
correct response (C^). In terms of irrelevant dimension levels (Table 8), 
pooling across relevant dimensions, normals tended to be more consistent 
with previously presented information when they added (A) a dimension to
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Table 7
Analysis of Hypothesis Behavior for Normals and Schizophrenics 
Across All Experimental Conditions
Characteris tics Normal (x) Schizophrenics (3c) P*
I 1.18 1.16 NS
EC .146 (.162)** .140 (.147) NS (NS)
EC, .150 .247 .075
EN .390 .433 NS
C .416 .441 NS
Cl .206 .289 NS
N .794 .692 .06
A .022 (.163) .046 (.043) NS ( .05)
D .045 (.064) .033 (.059) NS (NS)
A> D .012 (.010) .028 (.028) NS (NS)
D > A .007 (.016) .003 (.00) NS (NS)
A*D .201 (.287) .309 (.211) NS (NS)
Total N 50 50
* Based on ^ tests between means
** Numbers in parentheses are proportions of changes that are consistent 
with all previously given stimulus information.
Table 8
Mean Proportions of Each Hypothesis Characteristic at Each Level 
of Irrelevant Information for Normals and Schizophrenics
(Comparisons between Normals and Schizophrenics within each dimension
level are based on t-tests)
Hypothesis
Characteristics*
Normals 
2 4
Schizophrenics 
2 4
I 1.25 1.00 1.4 1.0 1.15 1.0 1.3 1.4
(.033) (.20) (.229) (.426) (.03) (.16) (.285) (.299)
EC .055 .069 .363 .304 .041 .117 .228 .431
ECj^ .075 .077 .396 .175 .086 .303** .396 .427
EN .325 .390 .304 .825 .364 .364 .604* .573
C .40 .531 .337 .298 .409 .487 I .372 .569**
Cl .131 .315 .225 .144 .206 .37 .352 .438
N .870 .685 .775 .856 .794 .630 .648 .562
00
t n
(Table 8 continued on next page)
Table 8 - continued
Normals Schizophrenics
Characteristics 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 6
(.216)** (.067) (.161) (.241) (.041) (.047) (.01) (.106)
k .00 .00 .089 .244 0.0 .023 .045 .300
(.10) (0.0) (.010) (.217) (0 .0) (.09) (.081) (.139)
D 0.0 0.0 .088 .274 0.0 .03 .076 .091
(0.0) (0.0) (.02) (.05) (.05) (0 .0) (.006) (.067)
A >D 0.0 0.0 .048 .024 0.0 .069 .035 .004
(0 .0) (0 .0) (.056) (.044) (0 .0) (0 .0) (0 .0) (0 .0)
D >A 0.0 0.0 .027 .015 0.0 .003 .007 .004
(.133) (.446) (.421)** (.159) (.224) (.281) (.156) (.061)
A“D .100 .200 .379 .247 .150 .341 .437 .596
Total N 20 15 10 5 20 15 10 5
00
ty>
*See page 82 for explanation of hypothesis characteristics
** Statistically significant at .05 level 
* Statistically significant at .06 level
Table 9
Mean Proportions of Each Hypothesis Characteristic at Each Level of 
Relevant Information for Normals and Schizophrenics
(Comparisons between Normals and Schizophrenics within each dimension
level are based on t-tests)
Hypothesis
Characteristics* 1
Normals
3 5 7 1
Schizophrenics 
3 5 7
I 1.2 1.13 1 .0 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.4
(.221) (.178 (.10) (.131) (.207) (.10) (.12)
EC .242 .130 .05 0 .266 .124 .045 .038
ECj^ .250 .143 .033 0 .307 .277 .143 .125
EN .650 .257 .267 0 .693 .256 .257 .275
C .364 .403 .45 .60 .327 .410 .656 .561
Cl .199 .194 .261 .162 .259 .329 .345 .362
N .802 .806 .739 .837 .741 .671 .655 .637
(Table 9 continued on next page)
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Table 9 - continued
Hypothesis Normals Schi zophrenlcs
Characteristics® 1 3 5 7 1 3 5 7
(.108) (.067) (.20) (.60) (.032) (0 .0) (.120) (.066)
A .089 .022 0.0 0.0 .103 .017 .00 0.0
(.109) (0.0) (0 .0) (.20) (.061) (.048) (0.0) (0 .0)
D .096 .022 0.0 0.0 .058 .033 0.0 0.0
(.025) (0 .0) (0.0) (0 .0) (.02) (0.0) (0 .0) (.20)
A >D .013 .022 0.0 0.0 .008 .017 .10 0.0
(.039)* (0.0) (0 .0) (0 .0) (0 .0) (0 .0) (0 .0) (0 .0)
D §A .017 .00 0.0 0.0 .007 0.0 .00 0.0
(.20) (.390) (.45) (0 .0) (.096) (.20) (.432) (.266)
A"D .355 .155 .10 0.0 .373 .33 .20 .20
Total N 20 15 10 5 20 15 10 5
00
00
*See page 82 for explanation of hypothesis characteristics 
* Statistically significant at .05 level
Table 10
Mean Proportions of Each Hypothesis Characteristic at Each Level of Stimulus 
Uncertainty (3, 5, or 7 Dimensions) for Normals and Schizophrenics
(Comparisons between Normals and Schizophrenics within each dimension
level are based on t-tests)
Hypothesis
Characteristics* 3
Normals
5 7 3
Schizophrenics
5 7
I 1 1.13 1.25 1 1.067 1.35
(.10) (.108) (.240) (.087) (.053) (.284)
EC .033 .139 .188 .087 .115 .197
ECi .007 .221 .130 .195** .260 .300**
EN .593 .379 .270 .404 .273 .450
C .267 .528 .412 .320 .486 .553
Cl .089 .406 .148 .215 .349 .397***
N .910 .594 .852*** .785 .650 .603
00
VO
(Table 10 continued on next page)
Table 10 - continued
Hypothesis
Characteristics*
Normals Schizophrenics
(0 .0) (.108) (.310)** (0 .0) (.041) (.078)
A 0.0 .037 .078 .035 .013 .088
(0 .0) (.007) (.104) (.038) (.010) (.120)
D 0.0 .0365 .085 .045 .017 .048
(0 .0) (.017) (.012) (.00) (.004) (.067)
A >D 0.0 .010 .022 .003 .007 .064
(0 .0) (.037) (.011) (0 .0) (0 .0) (0 .0)
D >A 0.0 .018 .004 .005 .005' .001
(.133) (.404) (.315) (.144) (.229) (.259)
A=D .100 .231 .178 .212 .291 .399*
Total N 10 15 20 10 15 20
VO
o
*See page 82 for explanation of hypothesis characteristics 
*** Statistically significant at .01 level
** Statistically significant at .05 level
* Statistically significant at .06 level
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their hypothesis. This reached significance at the 0 irrelevant level 
“ 1.87, 38 df, 2  <»05). Furthermore, at the 4 irrelevant level, 
normals were more consistent when they changed the composition (A » 2) 
of their hypothesis * 2.548, 18 df, 2  <«05). On the other hand, 
schizophrenics at the 2 irrelevant level had a higher percentage of 
changes after an incorrect response (EC^) than did normals = 2.11,
28 2  <*05); at the 4 irrelevant level they kept their hypothesis
after an error (EN) more frequently than normals (2* 1.65, 18 df, 2< .05); 
at the 6 irrelevant level they changed their hypothesis after a correct 
response (2) more frequently than did normals (2 “ 2.01, 8 df, 2  <*05).
It is again noteworthy that schizophrenics, in addition to higher per­
centages of shifts after errors, tended to have higher percentages of 
shifts after correct responses (C^) as well. In terms of relevant dimen­
sion levels (Table 9), pooling across complexity levels, normals and 
schizophrenics showed no significant differences in their hypothesis 
behavior with the exception that at the 1 relevant dimension level normals 
were more consistent (2 = 1.74, 38 df. 2  <*05) with previously presented 
information when they dropped dimensions more than when they added to 
their hypothesis (D> A). Finally, in terms of those conditions involving 
the same amount of stimulus uncertainty (Table 10), differences between 
normal's and schizophrenic's hypothesis behavior emerged mainly in those 
conditions involving 7 bits of actual stimulus uncertainty. Here, schizo­
phrenics had higher percentages of shifts after errors (2 * 1.68, 38 
2  <.05) and higher percentages of shifts after correct responses (2 ” 2.66, 
38 df, 2  <«01) than normals. The higher percentage of shifts after 
errors also reached significance in those conditions involving 3 bits of
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stimulus uncertainty (_t = 1.85, 18 df, 2^<.05). Furthermore, schizo­
phrenics changed the composition of their hypothesis (Â = D) more 
frequently than did normals » 1.63, 38 £<.06). On the other
hand, normals kept the same hypothesis more frequently when they were 
correct (N) than did schizophrenics (£ * 2.58, 38 £<.01); also,
when normals added a dimension to their hypothesis (A), they were more 
consistent with previously presented information (£ = 2.11, 38 df, £<.05). 
It is interesting to note that most of these significant differences in 
hypothesis behavior between schizophrenics and normals emerge in those 
conditions where maximum complexity, either by adding relevant redundant 
or irrelevant dimensions, is present in the stimulus series presented 
to each
In order to determine if each population group approached the 
task in a similar manner, percentages were computed based upon each 
subject's hypothesis responding. Sixty-eight percent of the normals 
and 62% of the schizophrenic's hypothesis responding was consistent 
with what each subject felt the solution to the problem was when asked 
after the task was completed. Furthermore, normals chose response key 
Â 51.7% of the time and response key 48.3% of the time whereas schizo­
phrenics chose A 52.2% of the time and ]B 47.78% of the time. There 
was no preference in either group for response key A or £. Finally,
76% of the normal's hypotheses centered on a relevant dimension for 
solution to the problem whereas only 62% of the schizophrenic's hypothesis 
centered on a relevant dimension. Also, ^ e n  each subject was asked 
after the task what the solution to the problem was, 94% of the normals 
stated one or more correct relevant dimensions for solution. This is
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compared to only 76% of the schizophrenics. This last difference between 
schizophrenics and normals was the only difference that reached signifi­
cance (^ » 1.9243, 18 2  c05).
In order to compare the relative salience of each dimension for 
the two population groups, the mean frequency of each dimension was com­
puted based upon the number of times each ^  responded to that dimension. 
The mean frequency of each dimension, ranked on the basis of the highest 
mean, for normals and schizophrenics, are shown in Table 11. In order to 
determine if the stimulus dimensions were equally salient for normals and 
schizophrenics, a nonparametric test, Wilcoxin matched-pairs signed-ranks 
test, was performed. The test indicated that the stimulus dimensions were 
not equally salient for normals and schizophrenics (2 = 0, N » 7, £ <  .02). 
As can be seen in Table 11, horizontal position was a more salient dimen­
sion for normals than for schizophrenics. On the other hand, number was 
a more salient dimension for schizophrenics than for normals.
Table 11
Mean Frequencies of Each Stimulus Dimension 
for Normals and Schizophrenics
(Means are ranked for each population on the basis of salience.)
Dimension Normals Dimension Schizophrenics
Form 22.96 Form 34.14
Color 21.82 Color 24.26
Horizontal Number 11.86
position 4.48 Size 11.66
Size 4.40 Orientation 8.62
Vertical Vertical
position 4.14 position 6.86
Orientation 3.84 Horizontal
Number 3.52 position 4.66
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Analysis of Demographic and Psychometric Tests
The results of the demographic and psychometric measures for 
each population group are presented in Table 12. As can be seen in 
Table 12, there were no significant differences between normals and 
schizophrenics on age, education, and intelligence (vocabulary and 
abstract tests). In terms of the rigidity battery, there was a 
significant difference between normals and schizophrenics on the motor- 
cognitive portion ■ 2.78, 98 £< .005), but not on the perceptual-
personality or psychomotor speed portions. The significant difference 
on the motor-cognitive test indicated that normals were less rigid 
than schizophrenics when shifting from one activity to another or making 
an effective adjustment to shifts in familiar patterns.
In addition to these group differences, several correlations 
were computed to relate the rigidity quotient scores to Cl errors 
(Table 13) and to the hypothesis behavior measures (Table 14). As can 
be seen in Table 13, none of the correlations were significant between 
the rigidity quotient scores and Cl errors for either normals or 
schizophrenics. Thus, rigidity-flexibility as measured in the present 
study does not relate to Cl errors for either group. However, the 
relationships between rigidity-flexibility and hypothesis behavior 
measures show quite different results (Table 14). First, on the 
motor-cognitive portion of the rigidity battery, normals showed signi­
ficant positive correlations when they added a dimension (A) to their 
hypothesis as well as when they used a focus gambling approach (A> 2  or 
2  >A). Schizophrenics showed only a significant positive correlation
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Table 12
Group Differences on Demographic and Psychometric Tests
Measure Normal Schizophrenic t^ 2
Age 38.46 38.84 .22 NS
Education 10.7 11.0 .43 NS
Shipley Vocabulary 26.2 25.7 .56 NS
Shipley Abstract 16.32 14.56 .93 NS
Motor-Cognitive
(Rigidity Quotient) 88.4 76.28 2.78 .005
Percep tual-Personality 
(IU.gidity Quotient) 90.34 90.38 .11 NS
Psychomotor Speed
(Rigidity Quotient) 76.56 76.62 .17 NS
Table 13
Correlations of Rigidity Quotient Scores with 
Concept Identification Errors
Rigidity Quotient Normals Schizophrenics Overall
_r 2 r_ 2 _r 2
Motor-Cognitive .09 NS -.259 NS .116 < NS
Personality-Perceptual -.09 NS .003 NS -.03 NS
Psychomotor-Speed -.205 NS -.101 NS -.147 NS
Table 14
Correlations of Rigidity Quotient Scores with Hypothesis Behavior 
(Rank Order Correlation Coefficient)
Hypothesis
NORMALS
Motor- Perceptual- Psychomotor 
Cognitive Personality Speed
SCHIZOPHRENICS 
Motor- Perceptual- Psychomotor 
Cognitive Personality Speed
racteristics* jr JL v_ 2 2 2 r_ 2 jC 2 r_ 2
I .170 NS -.011 NS .262 .05 .042 NS .013 NS -.072 NS
EC .09 NS .065 NS -.168 NS -.09 NS -.120 NS .190 NS
ECi .159 NS .08 NS -.110 NS -.019 NS -.008 NS .240 .05
EN .084 NS .09 NS .260 .05 -.230 NS -.087 NS -.172 NS
C .0004 NS .173 NS .175 NS -.026 NS .002 NS .259 .05
Cl .108 NS .330 .01 .289 .05 -.013 NS .143 NS .314 .05
N -.09 NS -.316 .05 -.271 .05 .059 NS -.157 NS -.334 .01
A .349 .01 .258 .05 .356 .01 .086 NS -.025 NS .186 NS
D .194 NS .207 NS .212 NS .135 NS -.02 NS .287 .05
A> D .345 .01 .266 .05 .362 .01 .284 .05 .181 NS .222 NS
D> A .262 .05 .194 NS .280 .05 .185 NS .184 NS .154 NS
A-D .124 NS .045 NS -.180 NS -.250 .05 -.091 NS .036 NS
VO
Ov
Total N 50 50 50 50 50 50
See page 82 for explanation of hypothesis characteristics
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when they added more dimensions than they dropped from their hypothesis 
(A >D). In addition, schizophrenics showed a significant negative 
correlation when they changed the composition of their hypothesis 
(A = D). Secondly, on the personality-perceptual portion, normals 
showed significant positive correlations between this portion of the 
rigidity battery and A, A >D, and of their hypothesis behavior. 
However, normals showed a significant negative correlation when they 
kept the same hypothesis after a correct response (N). Schizophrenics 
showed no significant correlations between this portion of the battery 
and their hypothesis behavior. Finally, on the psychomotor speed 
portion, normals showed significant positive correlations between this 
portion of the battery and A, A >D, D> A, 2» and of their 
hypothesis behavior whereas schizophrenics showed significant positive 
correlations on D, EC^, £, and of their hypothesis behavior. In 
addition, both groups showed significant negative correlations between 
the psychomotor speed portion and of their hypothesis behavior.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
Since the analysis of variance of errors was the main depen­
dent variable it will be discussed first. The first six original hypotheses, 
related to the analysis of errors, will be stated and discussed in order.
1. A significantly greater number of errors will be observed 
in the schizophrenic group than in the normal control group.
This hypothesis was partially supported and as such adds to a
considerable wealth of clinical and experimental evidence indicating 
that schizophrenic patients do not perform well on tasks requiring con­
ceptualization. However, this finding is limited by the fact that 
significant differences between schizophrenics and normals were found 
only at the higher levels of complexity, 4 and 6 bits of irrelevant 
information. As noted in Figures 4 and 5 schizophrenics performed as 
well as normals as long as the information load and number of alternative 
hypotheses were low, particularly with 0 bits of irrelevant information.
But as the irrelevant information and the number of alternative hypothe­
ses increased, schizophrenics performed poorer as compared to the normal
control group. To illustrate this last point, in the condition involving
the greatest information load, schizophrenics performed at almost chance 
level (Figure 11) while the normal group showed evidence of learning 
across trials. To account for the above finding, traditional explanations
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have often relied upon the "loss of abstract attitude," (Goldstein, 1939a) 
or Cameron's (1947) "overinclusion" concept as possible reasons for a 
conceptual deficit in schizophrenics. In this case, the present finding 
directly contradicts Goldstein's hypothesis. Schizophrenics are capable 
of forming abstract concepts (39 out of 50 solved the problems) and 
their performance is similar to normals, particularly with 0 irrelevant 
information. However, recent investigators (Chapman and McGhie, 1962; 
Yates, 1966b; Buss, 1966) have offered explanations involving a deficit 
in the processing of information. This explanation postulates that 
schizophrenics are unable to attend selectively to stimuli such 
that only relevant information is processed. That is, irrelevant inform­
ation, in addition to being a source of distraction, is not effectively 
screened out by the schizophrenic which results in an overloading of 
his limited information processing and storing mechanism. On the other 
hand, in those tasks requiring little information processing, the channel 
is operating well below capacity and the assimilation of information does 
not lead to overloading. Consequently, there is no detrimental effect 
upon performances. Thus, it would seem that the present finding is 
compatible with this explanation. Yet, it should be noted that the 
above finding can be explained in terms of other alternative theories, 
such as motivational theories. That is, it is possible to attribute 
the poorer performance of schizophrenics to a lack of motivation. To 
be sure, it is quite difficult in any study for an experimenter to 
know with certainty that he is extracting maximum performance from his 
subjects. In the present study, the schizophrenics were thought to be 
adequately motivated on the basis of several criteria: they volunteered
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to participate in the study; they were rewarded by extra and special 
attention; and they frequently expressed interest in the task. In 
addition, there was the distinct clinical impression that most 
schizophrenic subjects were trying to do their best and were pleased 
to be included in the study. When these impressions are combined 
with the fact that the stimulus situation both encourages and rewards 
the individual for maintaining his focus of attention on the relevant 
dimension, it seems reasonable to infer that the inferior performance 
of schizophrenics is likely to be due to an information-processing 
dysfunction which does not permit the continual focusing of attention 
to the same extent that is displayed by the normal individual. Finally, 
the importance of this finding lies in the fact that the deficit is 
demonstrated on a task that is characterized by standardized procedures 
and rigorous stimulus definition.
The importance of this finding should also be viewed in the 
light of the experimental control variables such as age, education, 
vocabulary level, and abstraction level. The care that was taken to 
insure control on these variables makes the effect observed even more 
unequivocal. It is also important to note that these groups differed 
only with respect to the motor-cognitive portion of the Test of Behavior­
al Rigidity. Here, schizophrenics were more rigid than normals when 
shifting from one activity to another or in making an effective adjust­
ment to shifts in familiar patterns. Thus, there would seem to be little 
doubt that the presence of schizophrenia in humans does have quantifiable 
effects and that these effects are shown to be related to higher concep­
tual activity.
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2. With Increasing Irrelevant Information (complexity), 
greater number of errors will be expected In both groups.
This hypothesis, as tested and supported by the complexity 
effect. Is one of the most striking results observed In this study.
Figure 2 Illustrates this finding with both Its linear and quadratic 
components. This finding Is most significant In that It confirms 
a rather extensive number of studies which have consistently shown the 
linear character of this variable (Bourne, 1957; Bourne and Pendleton, 
1958; Plshkln, 1960). However, the fact that a quadratic component 
was also significant, resulting from a decrease In errors at the 6 
Irrelevant level (Figure 2), lends support to the quadratic component 
found In the Archer, Bourne, and Brown (1955) study. These relationships 
have additional significance In view of the population differences 
(Figure 4). The -fact that a linear relationship was confirmed for 
the schizophrenic group tends to be consistent with previous studies 
(Plshkln, 1963; Plshkln and Wolfgang, 1964; Plshkln, Wolfgang, and 
Bradshaw, 1963; Plshkln, Shurley, and Wolfgang, 1967) whereas the fact 
that a quadratic relationship was observed for the normal group Is 
Inconsistent with most studies. It Is Interesting to note that the 
quadratic characteristic resulted from a decrease In errors at the 6 
Irrelevant level. At this level, the horizontal and form dimensions 
became the additional Irrelevant dimensions as compared to the 4 
Irrelevant level. It Is possible that these dimensions were less 
salient as Irrelevant dimensions, at least for the normal group.
Such a possibility Is analogous to the Archer, Bourne, and Brown (1955) 
and Brown and Archer (1956) studies where. In addition to a quadratic
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relationship, position of a pattern on the screen was a significant 
source of variance. In this respect, the relative salience of a cue 
or cues may change depending upon its spatial location in relation to 
where the subject responds and where the reinforcement is delivered. 
Indeed, this may have been the case in the problems at the 4 and 6 irre­
levant levels. Overall, the concept identification model does provide 
fairly well defined complexity levels that lead to differential responses. 
There is some doubt, however, that the dimensions are equally salient, 
particularly across various populations. Cue salience has only recently 
received considerable attention (Trabasso and Bower, 1968) and future 
investigations are needed.
3. With increasing irrelevant information, a relatively 
greater number of errors will result in the schizophrenic group 
as compared to the normal group.
This hypothesis was tested by the population by complexity 
interaction and was found to be insignificant. The assumption under­
lying this hypothesis is the interpretation that increasing irrelevant 
information leads to an overloading of the short-term memory system.
In terms of its face value, this assumption would appear not to be 
valid. However, as already pointed out, when irrelevant information 
increases, schizophrenics do perform poorer than normals although the 
performance is parallel in trend. Thus, if increasing irrelevant 
information adds to an overloading of the short-term memory system, it 
is not apparent here. Then in lAat way are these parallel effects 
meaningful?
One possible interpretation is suggested by a combination of
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events. These are: (1) The finding in the present study that the
two groups show no significant differences at the lower levels of 
complexity, (2) The significant differences between schizophrenics 
and normals on the motor-cognitive portion of the Test of Behavioral 
Rigidity, largely a perceptual adjustment task, (3) Tates' (1966b) 
theoretical formulation that schizophrenics suffer from an inability 
to effectively process or organize incoming information for orderly 
sequential presentation to the higher cortical centers, and, (4) Previous 
findings of similar parallel performances involving brain-damage and 
control subjects whereby an interpretation was suggested in terms of 
a non-specific perceptual deficit which leads to a breakdown in pro­
cessing information rather than a deficit in recalling information 
(Lawson, McGhie, and Chapman, 1967; Bum, 1967; Parsons, Majumder, 
and Chandler, 1966). If these events are taken together, they suggest 
a hypothesized deficit in attention and data processing which may 
account for the schizophrenic's poorer yet parallel performance. The 
basic proposition involved in the use of this interpretation centers 
around a possible deficit in selective attention (Chapman and McGhie, 
1962), a breakdown in perceptual mechanisms (Lawson et al., 1967;
Parsons, et ^ . , 1966; Bum, 1967), and the inability to effectively 
process incoming information for presentation to the higher cortical 
centers (Yates, 1966b). The deficit does not appear to be a memory 
function per se but rather a defect in the perceptual and processing 
mechanisms which adversely effect the subsequent levels involved.
Thus, many authors and investigators have argued for such concepts 
as "disturbed phase sequences" (Hebb, 1949), inadequate "filter"
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between cortical levels (Broadbent, 1958), or "gating" control 
mechanisms (Cheatham and White, 1952). The main purpose of these 
mechanisms is to effectively screen out the irrelevant information 
in order to allow relevant information to be processed and recorded. 
Consequently, the effects of a defective filtering process could 
result in psychological terms such as "instability of attention"
(Hebb, 1949), or "reduced psychological vigilance" (Shure and Halstead, 
1958).
In summary, it has been suggested that the reason schizo­
phrenics perform poorer than normals, particularly as irrelevant 
information increases, is best explained in terms of a defect in 
selective attention and in processing or filtering of information 
rather than in terms of an overloaded memory system. The findings 
in the present study seem to be consistent with this interpretation, 
although it should be kept in mind, as mentioned previously, that other 
alternative explanations are possible. That is, the primary impairment 
in schizophrenia may not be in cognition per se, but probably stems 
from an interaction of motivational, perceptual, and interpersonal- 
affective processes. Finally, it can be stated that this deficit is 
approximately equally evident at each level of irrelevant information 
(causing distraction) with the exception of the 0 irrelevant 
level in which the normal control group did not outperform the schizo­
phrenic group.
4. Increasing redundancy will lead to improved performance 
(less errors) In both groups.
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5. Due to the hypothesized improved performance with the 
introduction of redundancy» an interaction between complexity 
and relevant redundancy is also expected; performance will 
improve more as there is an increase in complexity.
The 4th and 3th hypotheses were tested by the redundancy main 
effect and the complexity by redundancy interaction terms. They were 
both significant and they will be discussed together. The basic assump­
tions involved here were made on the basis that redundancy of information 
facilitates encoding and processing of information, particularly in 
the presence of perturbation in a stimulus brought on by irrelevant 
information or noise. Figure 1 illustrates the above findings. These 
findings are important in that they confirm the results obtained by 
Bourne and Haygood (1959; 1961). This investigation also confirms 
these relationships on a population that is different from those used 
in the other studies involving the redundancy variable. Thus, it can 
be stated that with the addition of the present population the generaliz- 
ability of this variable is greater. Overall, there is little doubt that 
the variable of relevant stimulus redundancy facilitates correct per­
formance within the Cl framework, particularly as the complexity load 
increases.
6. The schizophrenic group will be expected to make more 
errors than the normal group as redundancy increases even though 
their performance should improve with redundancy, particularly 
in the presence of irrelevant information.
This hypothesis was tested by the population by redundancy 
interaction and was found to be insignificant. The prediction was
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based upon the assumption that redundant elements of a stimulus can be 
an additional source of distraction to the schizophrenic individual 
(if he attempts to discriminate and use all redundant details) even 
though redundancy increases the number of relevant cues available that 
^  can use to identify a set of stimuli correctly, particularly in the 
presence of irrelevant information. The failure of this hypothesis 
would seem to bring this assumption into question. As can be seen in 
Figure 3 and Figure 5, schizophrenics tend to make more errors than 
normals, particularly in the presence of irrelevant information, even 
though both group's performance improves as compared to non-redundant 
conditions. The effect of this redundancy variable upon the group is 
especially evident at the 0 complexity level (Figure 3). Schizophrenics 
made about the same number of mean errors in the most redundant condition 
as in the non-redundant condition resulting in a quadratic relationship, 
whereas normals illustrated a linear relationship reaching perfect 
solution each time in the most redundant condition. A Duncan's test 
revealed that there was a significant decrement in errors between the 
non-redundant and the most redundant condition for normals (32 df,
£  <.05) but not so for schizophrenics (32 df, £> .05). Furthermore, 
there was a significant difference between schizophrenics and normals 
on the most redundant condition (32 df, £  <.05). In terms of redundancy 
in the presence of irrelevant information (Figure 5), it has been 
demonstrated that the performance of both groups improves as coiiq>ared 
to non-redundant conditions. However, it is also evident that 
schizophrenics tend to make more errors than normals even with the 
presence of redundant cues. A £-test applied to the group differences
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at the 4 irrelevant and 3 relevant condition was significant = 2.71,
8 df. 2  <*05). Thus, it is obvious, in spite of the lack of statistical 
significance, there are differential group effects on the redundancy 
variable.
The interpretation of the overall effects would seem to be 
within the limits of the hypothesized distraction effects resulting from 
redundant elements of a stimulus. It would appear that the direction 
of these effects is interactive and suggests that normals are better 
able to use redundant elements of a stimulus to encode and process 
information in order to facilitate economical transmission of information. 
The schizophrenic group, on the other hand, as a possible result of a 
defective filter or screening mechanism, was not able to process the 
redundant information as effectively, particularly when many redundant 
elements were involved. It is interesting to note that at the 0 complexity 
level (noise-free situation) the findings regarding the normal control 
group contradict Rappaport's (1957) study on visual discrimination.
However, this contradiction is probably attributable to the fundamental 
differences between the two types of tasks. A similar finding, that 
normals improve their performance under redundancy with 0 complexity, 
was reported by Haygood and Bourne (1961). On the other hand, the 
findings regarding the schizophrenic group in a noise-free situation tend 
to lend support to Lawson et al. (1964). That is, redundant elements of 
a stimulus may act as additional sources of distraction for the schizo­
phrenic in that he may attempt to discriminate and use all (redundant) 
details of the stimulus. Yet, when the source of redundancy is relevant, 
this source is not as distracting as irrelevant information, and it does
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help the schizophrenic to process information more effectively. This 
latter finding lends support to other studies which have shown that 
schizophrenics benefit from situations in which the same information 
is available to them more than one time (Johannsen and Testin, 1966; 
Pishkin et al., 1962; Pishkin, 1966). In this respect, when the 
same information is viewed more than one time, it is redundant; it 
is this redundancy from idiich the schizophrenics benefit.
Trial Analysis Data
With trials to solution being the preformance measure, 
essentially the same results were obtained as with errors being the 
performance measure. With this in mind only the significantly more 
meaningful relationships will be discussed.
The significant trial main effect was interpreted to mean 
that learning was taking place across all blocks of trials (Table 4).
In addition to the significant trial main effect, the X  ^  %  x R, and
the T X X R (Table 4) interactions support the error analysis findings. 
That is, as complexity increases, more trials are required for solution 
or learning to take place; as redundancy increases, fewer trials are 
required; as complexity increases, redundancy becomes more facilitative 
requiring fewer trials. However, perhaps one of the most significant 
findings in the present study is the differences found in the learning 
curves (Figures 8 and 9) for normals and schizophrenics in each of the 
experimental conditions. It can be observed for normals that as the 
number of relevant and/or redundant dimensions increases and exceeds the 
number of irrelevant dimensions, fewer blocks of trials are required to
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reach solution. This supports the basic prediction in the mathematical 
theory of Bourne and Restle (1959). On the other hand, schizophrenics 
show more variability. In fact, it can be observed that as the 
complexity of the pattern increases, by adding irrelevant and/or redun­
dant dimensions (actual stimulus uncertainty), schizophrenics performed 
much poorer than normals. Figure 17 illustrates that this was particu­
larly evident in those conditions where seven dimensions made up the 
actual stimulus uncertainty. Thus, seven bits of actual stimulus uncer­
tainty may represent a limit at which point schizophrenic's information 
processing begins to break down completely. It is interesting that 
this finding is consistent with Miller's (1956) magical number seven. 
That is, it appears that the schizophrenics attempted to process each 
dimension (irrelevant and relevant redundant dimensions) on a separate 
and absolute basis such that idien the number of dimensions approached 
seven a breakdown in processing occurred. According to Miller, this 
breakdown would be expected since the span of absolute judgement and 
immediate memory impose severe limitations on our information processing 
capacity. On the other hand, normals did not show such a breakdown 
in processing of information ^ e n  the magic number seven was involved.
In this respect, it appears that the normals were organizing, or 
"chunking," the information so as to reduce the strain on the channel 
capacity. This was particularly apparent when relevant redundancy was 
introduced. Overall, this interpretation is only tentative until more 
data is accumulated, but it does lend support for the formulations 
that schizophrenics suffer from impaired selective attention and 
impaired perceptual mechanisms.In addition, the present finding
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supports Pishkin's (1966) conclusion regarding the schizophrenic's 
deficient channel capacity.
The significant 1 x 2  interactions at the level of 0 irrelevant 
information and at the level of 1 relevant dimension lend emphasis to 
the interpretation that increasing redundant dimensions and increasing 
irrelevant dimensions, respectively, may act as sources of distraction 
for the schizophrenic. However, when both types of information are 
combined or present at the same time in the stimulus source, redundancy 
facilitates the information processing of schizophrenics by overcoming 
the noise present in the channel. In this case, even though his per­
formance inproves, he may still not reach the performance level of the 
normal (Figure 10). There is little doubt that normals consistently out­
perform schizophrenics across all blocks of trials, but only as the actual 
stimulus uncertainty increases (Figures 12, 13, 14). Thus, it seems 
apparent that for the schizophrenic patient redundant cues are only 
beneficial for processing information when noise or irrelevant inform­
ation is in the channel. This does not seem to be the case with the 
normal individual. He can effectively filter out any irrelevant 
information or surplus information, and he can effectively select or 
focus on the relevant bit of information needed.
Vocal and Subvocal Data
The analysis of vocal and subvocal activity demonstrated 
that such activity increased with an increase in complexity (Table 5, 
section 2)* but decreased when relevant redundancy was introduced.
However, the decrease in talk time for redundancy took place only as
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Irrelevant information increased. Figure 16 reveals that with no 
irrelevant information decreases in talk time over redundancy were 
insignificant, but as the problem increased in difficulty talk time 
decreased with the introduction of redundancy.
It is interesting to note that significant group differences 
were demonstrated only on the complexity variable. That is, schizo­
phrenics had a significantly larger mean log talk time with complexity 
pooled and no redundant information than did normals. Furthermore, the 
significant C_ x 2  interaction (Figure 15) revealed that schizophrenics 
significantly increased their verbal activity with the introduction of 
irrelevant information, whereas normals showed a significant increase 
in verbal activity only between the 2 and 4 levels of irrelevant 
information. Finally, since the analysis of talk time closely resembled 
the error analysis, correlations were computed between errors and talk 
time. High positive correlations were found for both groups. This is 
consistent with a previous study by Wolfgang (1965).
In summary, the finding that spontaneous vocal and subvocal 
activity is directly related to errors and increases in complexity 
partially supports previous work. In this respect, it is interesting 
to note that Wolfgang, Pishkin, and Rosenbluh (1968) reported decreases 
in speech activity by schizophrenics in two man groups as the problem 
increased in difficulty. In the present investigation, decreases in 
verbal activity occurred only when redundancy was introduced in the 
presence of irrelevant information. Finally, in view of the significant 
group differences on the complexity variable whereby schizophrenics had
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larger vocal activity times than normals as the information load 
increased, it may be possible that increases in vocal activity by 
the schizophrenics was an attempt at using mediation processes in 
the solving of the Cl problems. This interpretation is based on 
Kendler and Kendler's (1962) hypothesis that mediational events in 
the problem solving behavior of adult human subjects are probably 
verbal. Kendler and Kendler reached this conclusion after performing 
a series of studies on concept formation involving reversal and non­
reversal shifts. In this respect, reversal shifts are considered 
harder to make than non-reversal shifts. However, results showed 
that adult human subjects performed the reversal shifts easier than 
the non-reversal shifts whereas pre-verbal children and lower organisms 
performed just the opposite. The interpretation of this finding led 
Kendler and Kendler (1962) to conclude that the mediator in adult 
human subjects is verbalization and that internal verbalization is 
a self-generated, cue producing behavior which tends to guide orien­
tation to the relevant attributes. In terms of the present study, 
if one accepts a regression theory of schizophrenia, then it may be 
possible that increases in vocal activity by the schizophrenics was 
an attempt at using primitive mediational processes in order to process 
the incoming information more effectively, particularly as the informa­
tion load increased.
Hypothesis Behavior 
First of all, the last of the hypothesis in the present study 
will be stated and discussed.
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7. Normal subjects will start with a more encompassing 
initial hypothesis, keep the same hypothesis after a correct 
response more frequently, and be more consistent with previously 
presented Information than will schizophrenic subjects.
This hypothesis Is partially supported In that normals tend 
to keep the same hypothesis after a correct response more frequently than 
schizophrenics (Table 7), and they are generally more consistent with 
previously presented Information, particularly when they add a dimension 
to their hypothesis (Table 7), or change the composition of their 
hypothesis (Table 8) or when they dropped more dimensions than they 
added to their hypothesis (Table 9). However, In all the analysis on 
hypothesis behavior, there were Insignificant differences on the number 
of dimensions Included In the Initial hypothesis of normals and schizo­
phrenics. It Is Interesting to note, however, that 12% of the normals 
and 8% of the schizophrenics started with a whollst approach. Although, 
for normals, this Is Inconsistent with the Bruner et al. (1956) study.
It does support Bourne's (1963) study In which 9% of the college students 
were considered to be whollst. The prediction that normals would start 
with a more encompassing hypothesis was based upon the assumption that 
normals being more efficient learners would adopt a whollst strategy 
more frequently than would schizophrenics. In view of the trial analysis. 
It was demonstrated that normals were more efficient learners than 
schizophrenics, particularly with Increasing complexity of the patterns. 
Since the results failed to support the prediction, there are several 
Interpretations possible. One Interpretation Is that the stimuli con­
tained so few dimensions (In some cases 1, 2, or 3 dimensions) that no
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regardless of his performance, had any difficulty keeping track of 
the changes. Furthermore, since redundancy was of the direct contingency 
type ^ s may have tended to group these dimensions together rather than 
seeing them as separate dimensions to be included in their hypotheses.
On the other hand, since the dimensions were always displayed in front 
of the subject in a row, this may have led the subjects to test one 
dimension at a time. However, there is little evidence to support 
this contention.
In analyzing hypothesis behavior at various levels of irrelevant 
information (Table 8), it is clear that at higher levels of irrelevant 
information schizophrenics tended to keep their hypotheses after an 
incorrect response, change their hypothesis more frequently after a 
correct response, and had higher percentages of shifts after errors as 
well as after correct responses when compared to normals. In addition, 
schizophrenics were less consistent with previous information when they 
changed their hypotheses, particularly when they added a dimension or 
changed the composition of their hypotheses. In view of these differences, 
it can easily be seen why normals were more efficient learners. Efficient 
performance would seem to depend upon proper use of previous information 
provided in the task, that is, the ability to remember past instances 
of the concept; it would seem to depend upon, theoretically, not changing 
a hypothesis after a correct response and changing the hypothesis only 
after error.
In analyzing hypothesis behavior at various levels of relevant 
redundant information (Table 9), differences among schizophrenic's and
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normal's hypothesis behavior dropped out. It is apparent that due to 
the facilitative effect that redundancy has upon performance, differences 
in amount of relevant redundant information did not differentially 
effect the hypothesis behavior. It seems likely that the limits on human 
memory and information processing ability are not exceeded by a suffi­
ciently large number of redundant dimensions.
When hypothesis behavior was analyzed on the basis of actual 
stimulus uncertainty (Table 10), significant differences were obtained 
mainly on those conditions involving 7 bits of actual stimulus uncer­
tainty. Schizophrenics showed higher percentages of shifts in their 
hypotheses after errors as well as after correct responses when compared 
to normals. Furthermore, these shifts were primarily changes in compo­
sition of the hypotheses. In this respect it appeared that schizophrenics 
were randomly choosing dimensions among the stimuli presented to them.
If it is in fact true that schizophrenics do not attend selectively to 
stimuli and tend to be more distractable, then, in the face of many bits 
of stimulus uncertainty (large number of irrelevant and/or redundant 
dimensions), they may adopt a strategy of shifting back and forth in a 
vain attempt to organize the information. On the other hand, normals 
significantly keep the same hypotheses more frequently when they were 
correct; when they added a dimension to their hypotheses, they were more 
consistent with previous information. In this respect, normals appeared 
to be focusers whereby they would adopt a strategy which consisted of 
retaining the hypothesis that worked better than chance and then introduce 
corrections into the hypothesis designed to discover the remaining
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correct solution. This Interpretation receives some additional support 
in that normal's hypotheses centered on a relevant dimension for solu­
tion 76% of the time as compared to 62% of the time for schizophrenics.
In addition, 94% of the normals identified correctly a relevant dimen­
sion in their problems after the Cl task was completed as compared to 
76% of the schizophrenics.
In summary, it can be suggested that based on the hypothesis 
behavior of normals and schizophrenics, both groups tended to adopt a 
partist approach with the normal being more of a focuser and the schizo­
phrenic being more of a scanner. This finding regarding the schizophrenic 
group lends support to Silverman (1963) who reported that extreme 
scanning characterizes the attention response styles of most schizophrenics. 
Furthermore, in the present study, schizophrenic's hypothesis behavior 
can be characterized by the fact that he does not change his hypothesis 
after an error, has a higher percentage of changes after a correct 
response as well as after errors, and is less consistent with previous 
information when he does make a change. On the other hand, normal's 
hypothesis behavior is characterized by the fact that he keeps his hypo­
thesis when he is correct, changes it only when he makes an error, and 
generally changes his hypothesis in one respect at a time (in size).
In addition, his hypotheses tend to be more consistent with previously 
presented information.
The present data suggest two distinct stages of hypothesis 
behavior or strategy that may occur in a ÇI task. The first stage is that 
of changing hypothesis frequently, though not necessarily on every error. 
This approach seems to be used until some hypothesis is discovered that
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results in performance better than chance. The second stage consists 
of retaining the hypothesis which works most often and attempting to 
discover the complete hypothesis for correct solution by making minor 
shifts or adjustments to the hypothesis. Once this solution is obtained 
the ^  makes no further hypothesis changes. Almost all of the normals 
appeared to follow such stages, while the schizophrenic subjects appeared 
to have difficulty with the first stage. This, of course, was dependent 
upon the amount of irrelevant and relevant redundant information contained 
in the problem.
Even though both groups approached the hypothesis task in a 
similar manner and responded to the response keys (Â or jB) in a similar 
manner, it is apparent that the stimulus dimensions were not equally 
salient for both groups. The horizontal position dimension was more 
salient for normals than for schizophrenics. In fact, the horizontal 
position dimension was the least salient for schizophrenics. In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that horizontal position was rele­
vant in six out of the ten experimental conditions. On the other hand, 
the number dimension was more salient for schizophrenics than for nor­
mals. It was the least salient dimension for normals. Again, it is 
interesting to note that number was relevant in only one experimental 
condition and irrelevant at all other times. Thus, on the basis of 
these facts, it is possible that the poorer performance of the schizo­
phrenic individual on the Cl task as well as the poor utilization of 
relevant cues is, in one respect, due to the unequal saliency of the 
stimulus dimensions. In addition, since color, form, and number 
as well as size were the most salient for the schizophrenic, it would
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appear that they were responding to the more detailed aspects of the 
stimulus situation rather than to the pattern as a whole or configura­
tion which seems to be the case with the normal Individual. Finally,
It Is possible to conclude that due to the unequal salience of the 
stimulus dimensions for the two populations, an extraneous source of 
variance was Introduced which contributed to the differences In the 
performances of the two groups. Therefore, It Is not enough to assume 
that the stimulus properties used In a concept task are equally salient 
for psychopathologlcal and matched control groups. It Is up to the 
researcher to demonstrate that they are.
In summary, while the findings were not entirely unexpected, 
they do provide an Important check on the relationship between measures 
based on two different types of performance, hypothesis responses and 
category responses. Overall, the results attest to the importance of 
measures and detailed analyses of hypothesis behavior In the development 
of a complete description and understanding of human conceptual 
functioning.
Hypothesis Behavior, Concept Identification, and Rigidity
Fey (1954), In a study using a card sorting task, reported 
that schizophrenics were characterized by preseveratlon and difficulty 
In maintaining a set when compared to normals. Fey pointed out that the 
tendency toward greater perseveration resulted from a tendency to continue 
sorting on the basis of a previously correct category which was no longer 
correct for solution to the problem. It was felt that on the basis of 
Fey's study, the perserveratlon may have resulted In the schizophrenics
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being rigid. That is, the schizophrenic individual may have had diffi­
culty in being able to shift effectively from one activity to another 
or to adjust to continuously changing situational demands. On this basis 
it was felt that a measure of rigidity would cast additional light upon 
the complex processes in conceptual functioning and hypothesis behavior 
of schizophrenics and normals. Thus, the rigidity battery used in the 
present study will be discussed as it relates to the concept identifi­
cation performance and to hypothesis behavior in relation to category 
responses.
In terms of the rigidity battery, the only measure which 
showed differences between the two groups was the motor-cognitive 
portion. Schaie (1955) interpreted the motor-cognitive score as the 
individual's ability to shift without difficulty from one activity to 
another or as a measure of effective adjustment to shifts in familiar 
patterns. In this sense a high score would indicate a degree of flexi­
bility; a low score reflects a degree of rigidity. Table 11 shows that 
normals were less rigid » 2.78, 98 df, 2  <»005) than schizophrenics 
on this portion of the battery.
In attempting to establish a relationship between the rigidity 
scores and concept identification errors, correlations were computed 
for both groups. As can be seen in Table 12 none of the correlations 
were significant for either group or overall. Thus, rigidity or flex­
ibility as measured in the present study does not relate to ÇI errors 
for either group. However, the relationships between rigidity-flexibi- 
lity and hypothesis behavior measures show quite different results 
(Table 13). First, in the motor-cognitive portion, the best predictor
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for normals was a degree of flexibility when changing their hypothesis, 
particularly when a dimension was added or when they used a focus 
gambling approach (A> 2  or A). On the other hand, the schizophrenic
group was only flexible when they added more dimensions to their hypo­
theses than they dropped. In contrast to the normal group, the schizo­
phrenic group displayed a significant negative correlation between 
rigidity and changing the composition of their hypothesis (Table 13). 
This lends some support to the previously mentioned finding that schizo­
phrenics make more changes In composition of their hypotheses even 
though they are not as consistent with previously presented Information 
as the normal Individual. Secondly, In tenus of the personality- 
perceptual portion of the battery, Schaie (1955) Interpreted this 
measure as the ability to perceive and adjust to new and unfamiliar 
patterns and Interpersonal situations. Again, there Is a positive 
relationship between the personality-perceptual measure and the 
normal's adding a dimension or adding more dimensions than they drop 
from a hypothesis. Furthermore, the normals display a degree of 
flexibility In making changes after a correct response. Perhaps 
most Interesting Is the relationship between keeping the same hypo­
thesis after a correct response (N) and rigidity on the personality- 
perceptual measure. In this sense a degree of rigidity seems to have 
helped the normal Individual maintain a correct hypothesis. On the 
other hand, the schizophrenic group showed no significant relationships 
between the personality-perceptual portion and hypotheses behavior 
measures (Table 13). Finally, In terms of the psychomotor speed 
portion, Schaie (1955) Interpreted this measure as the rate of emission
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of familiar cognitive responses. Here, a high score would seem to 
imply superior functional efficiency in coping with familiar situations 
requiring rapid responses and quick thinking. Once again, normals 
show a positive relationship between flexibility in psychomotor speed 
and changes (A, A> D, D> A) in their hypotheses whereas schizophrenics 
show such a relationship only when they drop a dimension from their 
hypotheses (D). Furthermore, normals show positive relationships 
between flexibility on psychomotor speed and initial hypothesis (^), 
keeping the same hypothesis after error (EN), and changing the hypothesis 
more frequently after a correct response (C^); on the other hand, 
schizophrenics show positive relationships between flexibility in 
psychomotor speed and changes in the hypothesis after error (EC^), and 
changes in the hypothesis after correct responses (C^, C^). In contrast 
to the flexibility scores and their respective relationships to the 
hypothesis behavior measures, both groups displayed a degree of rigidity 
on the psychomotor speed measure in relation to keeping the same hypo­
thesis after a correct response (N).
In summary, it can be concluded, based on the results (Table 13), 
that rigidity-flexibility is at least one predictor of performance in 
the hypothesis behavior of normals and schizophrenics in relation to 
category responses. In the present investigation, the best predictor 
for the normal control group, dependent upon the measure of rigidity- 
flexibility used, was a fairly consistent degree of flexibility when 
changes were made in the direction of their hypothesis as well as after 
correct responses. On the other hand, schizophrenics were less consistent. 
Only the psychomotor speed portion of the rigidity battery appeared to
123
be the best predictor of performance in hypothesis behavior for the 
schizophrenics. In this respect, the schizophrenics were more flexible 
when they made changes in their hypotheses after correct responses 
as well as after errors. Finally, there was a tendency for both groups 
to be more rigid when keeping the same hypothesis after a correct 
response. This was most evident for the normal control group.
Suggestions for Further Research 
One of the goals of this investigation in terms of further 
work was to test and evaluate certain predictions regarding the main 
experimental variables against the characteristics of the groups used.
That is, what aspects of the kinds of information presented here might 
lend themselves to use as a tool to study further specific questions 
regarding psychological deficit in schizophrenics and their ability 
to identify abstract concepts. Â consideration of the redundancy 
variable does not allow a definite conclusion. In one respect, redun­
dant information does have a general facilitative effect upon performance, 
particularly as irrelevant information increases. However, the failure 
of the population by redundancy interaction term revealed that the 
schizophrenic group did equally well on most levels of redundancy but 
only in the presence of irrelevant information. It was with no irrele­
vant information and many redundant elements that group differences 
appeared. One possible factor in this finding is the inadequate 
assumption of a demonstrable cognitive deficit in some of the schizo­
phrenic patients. That is, due to the practical consideration of lack 
of availability of homogeneous groups of schizophrenic patients, the
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results were possibly affected by some patients not demonstrating a 
cognitive deficit by any measure. The heterogeneity inherent within 
the classification of schizophrenia is well documented (see Lang and 
Buss, 1965) and requires particular methodological considerations.
Thus, the next step should entail the use of patients highly selected 
in terms of homogenous classification (e.g. acute versus chronic).
In this way the within groups variance can be cut down, which may lead 
to a more unequivocal demonstration of the relationship between the 
nature of the information to be processed and the conceptual behavior 
of the groups included.
A consideration of the conq>lexity variable brings forth a 
basic problem which should receive considerable attention in future 
investigations. In the present study, the finding of a significant 
linear effect as well as a significant quadratic effect tended to be 
inconsistent with many previous studies, particularly the failure to 
find the linear characteristic of this variable for normals. It was 
suggested that the reason for this finding may have been due to the find­
ing that the stimulus dimensions in the present study were not equally 
salient for both populations. Only recently have investigators focused 
on this problem, and to the author's knowledge no studies have been 
performed which have attempted to establish cue salience and their 
relative weights for different psychopathological groups.
Although the present investigation demonstrated that 
differences do exist in the hypothesis behavior of the two groups 
included, the assessment of such behavior did not lend itself to study 
of the role and influences of response sets, periodic errors, and per-
125
severation tendencies. This was due to the nature of the Cl task \^ich 
involves the presence of feedback and complexity of patterns.
Furthermore, observations indicated that some ^ s tended to overlook a 
dimension (which may have been relevant), respond to characteristics 
which never varied, and even introduced a dimension that was not part 
of the problem. In this respect, it was obvious that the universe of 
possible hypotheses from which the subject could draw varied from subject 
to subject. Thus, in order to overcome these deficiencies, it would be 
interesting to utilize a technique developed by Levine (1963, 1966).
This technique involves presenting a controlled series of stimuli such 
that by observing the pattern of responses, it can be established which 
of a pool of finite hypotheses (known exhaustively to ^) the subject is 
using. From such a technique it is possible to determine response sets, 
perseveration tendencies, and inconsistencies with the pool of allowable 
hypotheses.
In summary, it was demonstrated that the variables used in 
this investigation confirm to an impressive degree previous work.
Although not every prediction was confirmed, the attempt to further 
investigate conceptual activity with this task should continue. Finally, 
there is every reason to believe that if all the variables within the 
concept identification framework were applied to these groups, a better 
understanding of cognitive functioning of pathological groups as well 
as normal groups would be a reasonable certainty.
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Traditionally, the investigation of higher thought processes 
has been a prime objective in attempting to understand a psychological 
deficit in schizophrenia. Based on this objective, evidence in 
recent years has emerged suggesting that schizophrenics, unlike normals, 
suffer from impaired selective attention, inability to maintain a 
set, inability to process relevant cues effectively, and an inability 
to screen out irrelevant information in a message in order to process 
relevant incoming data. Furthermore, in the scientific investigation 
of cognitive processes, the concept identification framework has long 
been recognized for the value of its standardized procedures and the 
quantiflability of various dimensions. Here, the specific model 
involved utilizes a combination of information theory and mathematical 
models. With these fundamental assumptions in mind the present 
investigation has attempted to:
1. Extend the generalizability of the concept identification 
model by investigating the complexity and relevant redundancy variables 
on a schizophrenic and matched control population.
2. Show that variations among these two variables either 
support or do not support certain theoretical predictions regarding 
assumed differences in the information processing capacity of the 
two groups.
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3. Explore the assumed differences in the approaches to 
processing information and the identifying of abstract concepts
of the two groups by studying hypothesis behavior in relation to 
category responses.
4. Demonstrate for both groups that hypothesis behavior 
and utilization of relevant cues in concept identification is to some 
extent related to a rigidity-flexibility dimension.
The rationale of this experiment was based upon an attempt 
by many investigators to overcome the interference and distraction in 
the schizophrenic's information processing by utilization of the 
information theory concept of redundancy. However, reports on this 
variable have been contradictory. Some investigators report that 
redundant stimulus information facilitated the information processing 
of schizophrenics while other investigators report an interfering 
or distraction effect, tbst of these studies have been concerned 
only with the role of redundant information and have neglected to:
(1) systematically vary the amount of redundant information along 
with the amount of irrelevant information, (2) systematically investi­
gate the schizophrenic's approach as an efficient learner to a 
perceptual-cognitive task, and (3) evaluate the schizophrenic's 
ability to effectively utilize relevant cues. Thus, the present 
study attempted to satisfy these three neglected points. Finally, 
it was recognized that many variables such as diagnostic classification, 
length of hospitalization and illness, as well as intellectual level 
of the patient all must be considered as a source of variance that 
can influence the outcome.
The results of the error, trial, and hypothesis analyses 
generally supported the previously mentioned aims. The accomplishment
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of the first aim and the substantiation of previous work was reflected 
in the significant population main effect, the significant redundancy 
main effect, the significant complexity main effect, and the significant 
redundancy by complexity interaction term. These findings indicated 
that: (1) the schizophrenic group is significantly poorer on the
identification of abstract concepts, but only at the higher information 
load levels, (2) as the number of irrelevant dimensions increased, 
progressively more Cl errors occurred in both groups, (3) with the 
introduction of relevant redundant dimensions, progressively fewer 
Cl errors occurred in both groups, and (4) the amount of improvement 
under redundant conditions increased for both groups as the amount of 
irrelevant information increased. Overall, these findings lend 
greater generalizability to the mathematical model of ÇI with the 
addition of the present schizophrenic population. Indeed, it is 
remarkable to find two experimental variables that can be applied with 
fairly consistent effects across different populations.
The accomplishment of the second aim of this investigation 
is related to the performance of the two groups across the redundancy 
and complexity variables, across the actual stimulus uncertainty, 
and to the findings on the spontaneous vocal and subvocal activity. 
First, even thougjh the interaction effects of the population by 
redundancy and by complexity were not significant, differential effects 
were observed. Although both populations demonstrated a significant 
facilitation in performance when relevant redundancy was introduced, 
it is apparent that the schizophrenics did not benefit from relevant 
redundancy as much as the normal group did, particularly when no
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irrelevant Information was present. In addition, as already pointed 
out, fdien irrelevant information increases, schizophrenics do perform 
poorer than normals although the performance is parallel in trend. 
Secondly, in terms of the actual stimulus uncertainty, it was demon­
strated that the schizophrenics performed significantly poorer than 
normals as the actual stimulus uncertainty increased to seven bits 
of information. Finally, it was observed that schizophrenics signi­
ficantly increased their vocal activity with the introduction of 
irrelevant information whereas normals showed an increase only as 
four bits of irrelevant information were present. Taken together, 
these findings were discussed in terms of a conceptual deficit in 
schizophrenia resulting from an impaired selective attention, a 
breakdown in perceptual mechanisms involving the encoding and "chunking" 
of information, a defect in the screening or "filter" mechanism, and 
the inability to leam or utilize mediational processes in order to 
facilitate information processing.
The accomplishment of the third aim of this investigation 
is related to the performances of the different groups on the hypo­
theses formulated during category responses. Here, the results 
demonstrated that differences do exist between schizophrenic's and 
normal's hypothesis behavior when identifying abstract concepts.
Although both groups tended to adopt a partist approach, schizophrenics, 
when confronted with an increasing information load, tended to sample 
their hypothesis on a random basis. That is, the schizophrenic 
seemed to follow a scanning strategy of shifting back and forth in 
a vain attempt to find a workable hypothesis. On the other hand.
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normals seemed to be focusers, whereby they would adopt a strategy 
which consisted of retaining the hypothesis that worked better than 
chance and then introduce corrections into the hypothesis designed 
to discover the remaining, correct, solution. Finally, and perhaps 
most important, is the finding that the stimulus dimensions were not 
equally salient for two population groups. In this respect, there is 
little doubt that this finding is at least one of the factors which 
contributed to the differences observed in the performances of the 
two groups on the Cl task. Indeed, this variable must receive 
attention and control in future studies. It is not enough to assume 
that stimulus dimensions are equally salient for different population 
groups. This must be demonstrated to be the case.
Finally, the accomplishment of the last aim of the present 
study was done by a psychometric variable. Here, the results demon­
strated that while no correlative relationships between rigidity- 
flexibility and ÇI performance were found, there were significant 
correlations between the rigidity-flexibility measures and hypothesis 
behavior in relation to category responses. In view of the results, 
the major conclusion here was that although there were significant 
relationships between measured psychometric rigidity-flexibility 
and hypothesis behavior, the relationships are contingent upon the 
tests and the groups involved. In this respect, some caution is 
necessary in making any generalizations regarding hypothesis behavior 
based on a particular measure of rigidity-flexibility.
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CRITERIA FOR GROUPS
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Criteria for Schizophrenic Population 
All patients tested were selected according to the
following:
1. Diagnosis of schizophrenic (any type) by at least two 
ward psychiatrists.
2. At least three years duration of disorder.
3. Twenty months or less current hospitalization.
4. Between 20 and 55 years of age.
5. Minimum of eighth grade education.
6. No brain damage, no seizures, no psychosurgery, 
and no visual impairment.
7. The ability to cooperate and understand instructions 
as estimated by the psychiatric staff.
NOTE: All schizophrenic patients received various degrees of psycho­
tropic drugs. Since it was not possible to take the schizophrenic 
patients off the psychotropic drugs they were receiving, it was 
necessary to make the assumption (in the interest of the design and 
in relation to the availability of subjects) that "drug effects" 
could add a source of variation. However, those patients receiving
dosages equivalent to 400 mg. thorazine daily or higher were excluded
from the group. In addition, those patients showing any severe 
behavioral reactions to the psychotropic drugs were eliminated from 
the study.
Criteria for Normal Population 
The normal group was selected on the basis of the following:
1. Between 20 and 55 years of age.
2. Minimum of eighth grade education.
3. Twenty months or less current hospitalization.
4. No brain damage, no psychiatric impairment, no 
seizures, and no visual impairment.
5. The ability to cooperate as estimated by ward 
nursing staff.
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NOTE: Some of the normal patients were receiving various degrees of
psychotropic drugs (e.g. Meprobamate) and sedatives.
In general, any patients with the following primary or 
secondary diagnoses were excluded from both groups:
1. Alcoholism.
2. Arthritis.
3. Parkinsonism.
4. Long-standing and uncontrolled diabetes.
5. CVA.
6. Blood dycrasias.
APPENDIX II
STIMULUS DIMENSIONS
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Relevant and Irrelevant Stimulus Dimensions
The ten treatment conditions involving dimensions used as 
relevant (R) and irrelevant (I) are as follows :
Number of Relevant Dimensions
Number of
irrelevant
dimensions
1 3 5 7
R
0
I
C
ZERO (1)
C,H,F
ZERO (3)
C,H,F,V,0 C,H,F,V,0,S,N 
ZERO (5) ZERO (7)
R
2
I
C
N,S (3)
C,H,F
N.S (5)
C,H,F,V,0 
N.S (7)
R
4
I
C
N,S,0,V (5)
C,H,F
N,S,0,V (7)
R
6
I
C
N.S.O.V.F.H (7)
NOTE: The letters in the cells were the dimensions used; Ocolor;
H»horizontal position; F-form; V*vertical position; S-size; 
O»orientation; N-number. The number in parenthesis represents 
the actual stimulus uncertainty.
APPENDIX III
INSTRUCTIONS
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Instructions
Each subject was read the following Instructions:
This Is a throat microphone. When you speak try to avoid 
speaking In a very loud or a very soft voice. Your normal voice will 
be fine. (Experimenter puts first example on the screen.)
Listen carefully to these Instructions. This Is a study of 
concept learning. On the screen In front of you, you will see a series 
of patterns, one at a time. (For example, you see the yellow X here, 
this will be followed by a yellow ^ . ) Your job Is to sort these 
patterns Into two groups, A and (Key A and Key For example, 
you could put the X here, group A, and the Y here, group Actually 
It Is as If I gave you a deck of playing cards and asked you to put 
all the number cards In group A and all the face cards In group B^.
Now, In the problem I give you, the basis for sorting the 
patterns Into group A or group will depend upon the characteristic 
or characteristics of the patterns, (one, more, or all) (Experimenter 
explains all the characteristics) In the example you see here the 
correct characteristic Is F, form (X & Y). First, you would push 
button F, then key A. When you have chosen the correct group for 
sorting, the light just above the key will light up. When you have 
chosen the wrong group, the light above the other key will light up. 
Now, In the problem that I will give you, your job Is to discover the 
correct basis for sorting the patterns by using these characteristics 
so that the light above the key (A or ^ ) that you choose will light up 
each time. If you are not sure, guess; your guess or hunches may turn
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out to be right, and it is important that you be right as often as 
possible. The patterns will change in various ways (like X and Y 
change) but the basis for sorting will remain the same throughout all 
the patterns.
Remember, first you choose the characteristic or character­
istics (one, more, or all) that you feel is the correct basis for 
sorting the patterns. (Experimenter explains use of correction button) 
Secondly, you then decide whether the pattern goes into group A or 
group 2» You may take as much time as you wish in making your decisions. 
Finally, I will stop you after you have made 16 correct sortings in a 
row. Any questions before we go through the examples?
Examples
In the following examples, you will see a yellow X with a 
black line followed by a yellow Y with a black line. The correct 
characteristic for these examples is button or form, and the correct 
basis for sorting is that all X's go in group A, and all Y_'s go in 
group Remember, each time a pattern appears, you must first choose 
the characteristic or characteristics you feel is correct, then push 
key A or key and always try to be correct.
Example I: In this example you see a yellow X with a horizon­
tal black line. Here, the correct characteristic is 2  and the correct 
basis for sorting is X goes to key A. You first push button 2> then 
key A. Would you do this now?
Example II : In this example you see a yellow Y with a 
horizontal black line. Again, the correct characteristic is F and the
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correct basis for sorting is Y goes to key You first push button 
2, then key 2* Would you do this now?
Example III: Here, you see a yellow X with a vertical black
line. Again, you first push characteristic button £, and then key A.
Go ahead.
Example IV: Here, you see a yellow Y with a vertical black
line. Again, button F first, then push key 2* Go ahead.
Remember, your task or job is to discover the correct basis 
for sorting by first choosing the characteristic or characteristics 
you feel is correct, then sorting the patterns into group A or 2* Let's 
go through the examples again and this time you do them. Any questions? 
(The experimenter tells the subject that the problem will be different 
from the examples, and then has the subject begin the experimental 
problem. )
APPENDIX IV
PRESENTATION ORDER, DEMOGRAPHIC, PSYCHOMETRIC, ERROR, 
TRIAL, TALK TIME, AND HYPOTHESIS CHARACTERISTICS
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Order of Testing
Redundancy 1 3 5 7
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
SCHIZOPHRENICS
6 2 3 16 13 27 5 20 1 22
21 31 19 17 15 28 23 25 4 29
Repli­
cations 49 32 61 79 64 35 33 70 56 62
83 75 111 80 96 101 95 102 99 100
114 103 112 104 108 106 105 110 107 109
NORMALS
7 18 38 12 10 8 26 42 36 44
30 47 39 40 46 11 37 52 41 45
Repli­
cations 48 66 60 55 54 50 51 68 58 57
73 82 90 76 72 71 67 77 63 59
97 91 94 87 86 89 92 81 93 88
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Redundancy
Age
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
SCHIZOPHRENICS
28 51 39 36 47 49 32 36 31 49
Repli­
42 47 24 25 38 42 50 38 39 34
cations 34 34 49 33 46 37 44 33 23 42
42 29 36 29 44 45 40 47 43 35
21 54 41 44 36 40 36 45 36 47
NORMALS
48 55 49 36 33 49 46 45 44 52
21 36 46 48 47 45 40 47 38 50
Repli­
cations 37 30 35 25 21 33 49 23 44 25
39 49 21 27 42 44 36 42 22 41
25 44 37 40 37 38 44 40 22 36
Redundancy
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Education
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
SCHIZOPHRENICS
12 9 13 11 8 10 16 14 8 12
15 12 12 12 8 9 12 8 9 8
Repli­
cations 12 11 11 15 12 10 8 14 10 8
12 12 9 10 8 .17 13 16 10 12
10 8 8 12 12 12 8 8 8 16
NORMALS
8 8 11 12 10 16 11 12 10 12
10 10 12 8 11 10 8 12 10 12
Repli­
cations 14 13 10 12 12 11 8 12 9 12
8 8 13 10 12 9 12 9 11 12
16 13 10 10 8 8 8 12 10 10
Redundancy
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Shipley Vocabulary Score
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
SCHIZOPHRENICS
24 33 23 24 15 30 31 34 11 33
34 20 27 23 30 29 31 24 26 3
Repli­ -
cations 31 23 27 31 30 23 28 29 11 27
21 25 15 25 24 36 34 31 26 27
30 12 10 31 22 32 28 25 28 38
NORMALS
28 19 19 22 29 37 24 20 21 35
17 18 27 30 25 30 24 24 25 29
Repli­
cations 34 37 39 18 32 31 25 27 29 16
23 20 29 17 36 26 28 27 18 29
31 34 26 29 23 32 20 18 23 30
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Shipley Abstract Score
Redundancy 1 3 5 7
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
SCHIZOPHRENICS
14 18 12 20 4 12 24 22 2 28
22 8 12 20 14 10 6 10 26 8
Repli­
cations 6 4 32 24 12 6 0 20 2 4
10 22 2 2 6 12 26 24 18 22
32 6 2 16 8 36 20 - 4 20 38
NORMALS
12 4 6 18 28 30 12 6 12 12
12 18 10 18 6 28 6 16 20 30
Repli­
cations . 30 28 22 8 30 4 6 24 12 12
16 10 30 12 24 12 18 28 26 24
36 22 10 12 8 6 6 6 22 8
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Psychomotor Speed Rigidity Quotient Score: Âge Scaled
Redundancy 1 3 5 7
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
SCHIZOPHRENICS
78 94 74 95 68 79 88 73 47 74
76 57 75 60 65 68 76 80 68 65
Repli­
cations 65 65 68 98 91 70 68 94 68 74
74 87 87 62 68 92 74 100 76 73
101 68 68 66 82 94 83 74 97 92
NORMALS
70 65 60 66 59 87 77 66 58 74
68 80 62 81 66 84 67 74 80 81
Repli­
cations 114 111 80 66 83 96 77 83 74 69
74 51 105 60 92 64 102 68 84 68
75 94 79 95 71 70 56 88 71 85
Redundancy
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Errors (Cl): Original Scores
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
SCHIZOPHRENICS
4 85 102 98 0 84 7 0 16 0
1 6 95 105 0 0 9 0 0 15
Repli­
cations 5 6 72 97 1 0 9 0 4 0
2 4 59 111 0 7 2 0 0 0
2 88 90 94 0 0 4 5 3 8
NORMALS
2 29 91 6 0 0 0 0 3 0
- 3 1 95 10 1 0 5 0 0 0
Repli­
cations 1 0 66 15 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 48 18 67 0 4 3 1 0 0
0 3 21 98 1 1 0 1 0 0
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Talk Time in Seconds: Original Scores
Redundancy 1 3 5 7
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
SCHIZOPHRENICS
5 245 133 157 2 141 56 34 19 0
0 66 46 234 3 2 5 22 1 20 -
Repli­
cations 8 9 23 141 2 1 . 20 1 0 10
6 10 49 67 3 15 2 1 0 43
0 24 47 160 0 2 132 5 6 70
NORMALS
13 2 41 38 3 0 7 7 1 11
2 5 54 4 14 8 11 4 13 33
Repli­
cations 3 4 222 7 1 0 0 21 1 1
14 2 12 26 10 11 11 3 1 8
10 9 24 168 7 18 6 9 2 1
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Mean Errors for 12 Blocks of 16 Trials (Cl):
Based on 3 Replications
SCHIZOPHRENICS
Redundancy 1 3 5 7
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
2.8 4.6 8.8 8.0 0.2 2.2 5.2 0.8 3.2 2.0
0 4.4 8.6 8.4 0 1.8 1.0 0.2 1.4 2.4
0 3.2 6.8 8.6 0 1.4 0 0 0 0.2
0 3.6 6.8 8.6 0 1.2 0 0 0 0
0 2.8 7.4 8.6 0 1.8 0 0 0 0
Trial
0 2.4 7.8 9.0 0 1.2 0 0 0 0
Blocks
0 2.4 9.4 9.0 0 1.2 0 0 0 0
0 3.0 8.2 9.0 0 1.8 0 0 0 0
0 3.0 5.6 6.4 0 1.6 0 0 0 0
0 2.6 5.2 9.0 0 1.4 0 0 0 0
0 2.6 4.6 9.2 0 1.2 0 0 0 0
0 3.2 4.4 6.8 0 1.4 0 0 0 0
164
Mean Errors for 12 Blocks of 16 Trials (Cl):
Based on 5 Replications
NORMALS
Redundancy
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
2.0 3.0 9.0 7.0 0.4 1.0 1.6 0.4 0.6 0
0.4 4.4 7.2 5.0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2.8 6.0 3.0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2.2 3.8 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trial
0 1.0 5.2 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Blocks
0 1.4 4.0 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.8 4.0 2.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.2 5.2 2.0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.4 4.8 2.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 4.0 2.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 3.0 1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2.0 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Mean Proportions for the Hypothesis Characteristics:
Based on 5 Replications
Redundancy
SCHIZOPHRENICS
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
Hypothesis 
Characterls tic 
I 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.60 1.20 1.00 1.40
EC .10 .17 .20 .43 0 .12 .25 .03 .06 .04
ECi 0 .39 .31 .49 0 .35 .48 .12 .17 .12
EN .90 .61 .57 .20 .05 .52 .08 .43 .27
C .10 .44 .20 .57 .20 .48 .54 .77 .54 .56
Cl .01 .30 .28 .44 .12 .44 .42 .32 .17 .36
N .99 .69 .72 .56 .87 .56 .58 .67 .64 .64
A 0 .07 .04 .30 0 0 .05 0 0 0
D 0 .09 .05 .09 0 0 0.10 0 0 0
A>D 0 .01 .02 .01 0 0 .05 0 .20 0
D>A 0 .01 .01 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0
A=D .20 .42 .27 .59 0 .40 .60 .20 .20 .20
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Mean Proportions for the Hypothesis Characteristics:
Based on 5 Replications
NORMALS
Redundancy
Complexity 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 0 2 0
Hypothesis 
Characteristic 
I 1.40 1.00 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.60
EC .22 .06 .38 .30 0 .04 .35 0 .10 0
EC^ .20 .01 .51 .18 0 .15 .28 0 .07 0
EN .50 .79 .49 .82 .40 .25 .12 .40 .13 0
C .40 .33 .42 .30 .20 .76 .25 .40 .50 .60
Cl .07 .16 .41 .14 .01 .53 .04 .27 .25 .16
N .93 .83 .59 .86 .99 .47 .96 .72 .75 .84
A .00 0 .11 .04 0 0 .07 0 0 0
D .00 0 .11 .27 0 0 .07 0 0 0
A >D .00 0 .03 .02 0 0 .07 0 0 0
D >A .00 0 .05 .01 0 0 0 0 0 0
A=D .40 .20 .49 .05 0 .20 .27 0 .20 0
